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This article discusses the Supreme Court’s use of the rhetoric of white innocence in
deciding racially inflected claims of constitutional shelter. It argues that the Court’s use
of this rhetoric reveals that it has adopted a distinctly white-centered-perspective which
reveals only a one-sided view of racial reality and thus distorts its ability to accurately
appreciate the true nature of racial reality in contemporary America. This article
examines the Court’s habit of consistently choosing a white-centered-perspective in
constitutional race cases by looking at the Court’s use of the rhetoric of white innocence
first in the context of the Court’s concern with protecting “innocent whites” in
affirmative action cases and second in the context of the Court’s racialization of the
Fourth Amendment’s requirements regarding the substantive content of the reasonable
person standard in citizen police encounters. This article concludes that the Court’s
insistence on choosing and imposing only one racialized perspective – the whitecentered-perspective—in racially inflected constitutional claims is more than simply bad
policy, it also constitutes an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This article thus calls for an appreciation of the
dominance and problematic character of the judicial imposition of a single arbitrarily
chosen racial perspective in deciding all constitutional race cases. Thus it calls for a
modification in judicial decisionmaking in which judges become conscious of the whitecenteredness and racial contingency of the white-centered vantage point. In this way it
urges a judicial appreciation of multiple levels of racial interpretation in an effort to
loosen the hegemonic grip of the white-centered-perspective and dilute its power to both
name and punish, and thereby reduce it from its current dominance into just one more
option among equally respected racial perspectives competing fairly for judicial
recognition and legitimization.
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Once we see that any point of view, including one’s own, is a point of view, we will realize that every
difference we see is seen in relation to something already assumed as the starting point. Then we can
expose for debate what the starting points should be. The task for judges is to identify vantage points, to
learn how to adopt contrasting vantage points, and to decide which vantage points to embrace in given
circumstances.1

During the extensive media coverage of the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina2 in the
late summer of 2005, two contrasting media images from flood ravaged New Orleans
captured the public’s imagination and painfully exposed the stark differences between the
white-centered and the non-white-centered perspective on racial matters in contemporary
America.3 The day after the catastrophic flooding, with much of the Gulf Coast in ruins,
thousands dead and dying, hundreds of thousands homeless, and tens of thousands
trapped in the flooded city of New Orleans, Yahoo News published two pictures of the
flood survivors on its website that immediately sparked a national controversy.4 The
pictures were strikingly similar in content but were accompanied by starkly different
descriptive captions.
In one picture, a young black man is shown wading through chest high water
carrying bundles of food in both hands. In the other, two young whites, one a man the
1

Id at 15 (“A difficulty here, as always, is who is “we.” Writing not just for judges, but for all who judge, I
mean to invoke a abroad array of people in the exploration of justice. Yet the perspective I advance cannot
escape my own critique of the partiality of every perspective.”)id.
2
See Anna Mulrine, To the Rescue: After a Sluggish Response, A Rush to Help and Rebuild, U.S. News
and World Report, September 12, 2005 p.22 (“It didn’t look like America, the exodus of stunned refugees
wading through turbid, waist-high water, carrying only what mattered most: sick relatives, bundled babies,
storm soaked family Bibles. It looked like another country, the kind of place where armed bandits
outnumber police and desperate families search garbage dumpsters for food. A place where the poorest of
the poor die in the heat, their corpses ignored on the side of the road.”)
3
See Evan Thomas, The Lost City, Newsweek, September 12, 2005 page 44 (“The TV images of hundreds
and thousands of people, mostly black and poor, trapped in the shadow of the Superdome. And most
horrific: the photographs of dead people floating facedown in the sewage or sitting in wheelchairs where
they died, some from lack of water.”) It is indeed hard to imagine that if over 100,000 white middle or
upper class people were trapped in a major American city after a devastating natural disaster, that the
government would have made them wait for 5-6 without food, water or rescue. Instead, the enormity of the
suffering coalesced around the intersection of both class and race.
4

See Clarence Page, When Sluggishness Isn’t OK, Chicago Tribune page 9, September 4, 2005 (“Other emailers sent me copies of two news photos that revealed an apparent double standard regarding black and
white flood victims in New Orleans.”)

6

other a woman, are also shown wading through deep water and similarly carrying bundles
of food in both hands. However, that is where the similarity ends. The captions describe
the young black man judgmentally as a “looter;” in sharp contrast the similarly situated
whites are benignly described as mere “finders.”5
The only difference between the two pictures, and thus the only basis for the
differences in their respective captions is the apparent racial identity of their subjects.
Through this “visual rhetoric”6 and racialized narrative, solely by virtue of his blackness,
the black man is characterized as a criminal, a predator exploiting a tragedy, and thus
clearly morally blameworthy and deserving of condemnation. In contrast, solely on the
basis of their whiteness, the whites are characterized as innocent and perhaps even heroic
victims, bravely struggling to survive a great natural disaster and thus equally clearly,
beyond moral blameworthiness or condemnation.
The difference in these captions reflects a “white-centered” perspective in which
blacks are seen as inherently criminally suspect and morally undeserving – even of food
in times of natural disaster. In contrast, whites are seen as innocent, heroic, and therefore
implicitly deserving victims struggling against nature. However, if one views both
photos from a non-white-centered perspective, they both depict commensurate heroism
and valor by people struggling in the face of a great national tragedy without the

5

The actual captions read: “A young man walks through chest deep flood water after looting (emphasis
added) a grocery store in New Orleans” and “[t]wo residents wade through chest-deep water after finding
(emphasis added) bread and soda from a local grocery store after Hurricane Katrina came through the area
in New Orleans.” http://news.yahoo.com/photo/050830/480/ladm10208301530/print and
http://news.yahoo.com/photo/050830/photos_ts_afp/050830071810_shxwaoma_p (last visited August 25,
2005); See also, Clarence Page, supra (“Apparently…it’s not looting if you are white. Such are the
sentiments and suspicions about race and class that churn just beneath the surface of our daily discourse.”)
6
See, RICHARD DYER, WHITE (Routledge, 1997) at 44 nt. 4 (describing the “visual rhetoric of
whiteness.”)
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necessity of projecting a racialized and stereotyped judgment regarding their worth,
character or values.7
These conflicting interpretations of essentially the same pictures represent a vivid
and evocative example of the racially inflected difference between viewing reality from a
starting point or “white point in space”8 that reflects a racialized white-centered
perspective as contrasted with one that reflects a non-white-centered vantage point on
reality; especially racial reality in America. Part of the difference in these racialized
perspectives reflects the fact that “the eye that sees is not a mere physical organ but a
means of perception conditioned by the traditions in which its possessor has been
reared.”9 Thus, because race and color have such a profound influence on the life
experiences and life chances of people in America, they also have a profound effect on
how whites and non-whites10 perceive racial reality.
This racial influence on perception is particularly important because, in this way,
race itself can be understood as a “mode of perception”11 or as a distortive lens through
which reality is perceived that provides the basis for both conscious and unconscious
“racial judgments…about people’s capacities and worth.” 12 Therefore, because of
America’s unique history as an “overtly racist regime,”13 and a “white dominated

7

See Clarence Page, supra (“Would the storm victims have been rescued with greater urgency had they
been mostly white and middle class instead of black and poor? I don’t have all of the answers, but I’m
gratified that black people are not the only people who are concerned about the question.”)
8
RICHARD DYER, WHITE 3 (Routledge, 1997)
9
MATTHEW FRY JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN
IMMIGRATION AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 10 (Harvard University Press, 1998) [hereinafter
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color]
10
See RICHARD DYER, WHITE 1 (Routledge, 1997) re: Non-white reference.
11
Id at 11
12
RICHARD DYER, WHITE 1 (Routledge, 1997) (These racial judgments are driven by and are
fundamentally “inextricable from racial imagery [which] is central to the organization of the modern
world.”)
13
GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 100-101 (Princeton University Press,
2002) [hereinafter Fredrickson, Racism] (describing the United States, South Africa, and Nazi Germany as
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society”14 the dominant and thus default perspective in all public and official space could
accurately be described as one that is, white-centered, or “white-framed,” and that
reflects “white-specific characteristics, attitudes and experiences,” and “unexamined
white ways of thinking about race.”15 Thus the white-centered vantage point presumes
the “power to name – determine perception, and ultimately, prescription.”16
The power of the white-centered perspective to “name and determine perception”
especially in the language and decisions of America’s judiciary, is critically important to
the future on the nation. This is because the white-centered perspective constitutes a
distinctive way of “seeing,”17 or the “accepted but unexamined white ways of thinking
about”18 and experiencing race in the world. In this way, the white-centered-perspective
has come to occupy a “privileged strategic location in a racialized social
system…[whose] views, fears, and rationalizations take a central position in the overall
“ideological ensemble” of a society.”19 The problem is that from this central position, the
white-centered-perspective through “sheer force of naked power…[has]

the only “overtly racist regimes” because “[n]owhere else were the political and legal potentialities of
racism so fully realized.”) id.
14
WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 34 (Brown, et. al. eds.)
(University of California Press, 2003 [hereinafter Brown, Whitewashing Race]
15
Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 987 (1992-93) [hereinafter Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I
See]
16
Brown, Whitewashing Race supra at 35
17
See, DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON RACE,
POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY 14 (Verso, 1994) [hereinafter Roediger, Abolition of
Whiteness] (noting “the way many whites see.”)
18
Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 987 (1992-93) (also noting the use of “transparently whitespecific criteria of decision” and “white-specific characteristics, attitudes, or experiences.”)
19
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL
RIGHTS ERA, 62 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) [hereinafter Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy] (noting
that the “ideological ensemble of a society” consists of “racial, class, and other forms of hierarchical
structurations…[and that] the focus [here is] exclusively on the racial aspects of the ideological ensemble.”)
id at 83 nt. 16.
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foreclose[d]…the common ground upon which we can listen and learn.”20 Thus, as
Cornel West points out, “the challenge is mustering the courage to scrutinize all forms of
dogmatic policing of dialogue and to shatter all authoritarian strategies of silencing
voices…[because] we must respect the scars and wounds of each one of us – even if we
are sometimes wrong (or right).”21
The racing process22 in the West generally but in America especially is, “deeply
embedded in the symbolic and expressive life of the nation, and the narrative
account[s]”23 that are deployed to describe racial reality. The depth and intensity of this
racing process in America is such that, rather than fostering a common national
perspective it has instead engendered rival and distinctly racialized perspectives or
“vantage points”24 between white-centered and the non-white-centered perspectives.
This is a critically important observation because as Malcolm Gladwell has observed,
when “reduced to its simplest elements, even the most complicated of relationships and
problems…have an identifiable underlying pattern.”25 This article argues that the central
“identifiable underlying pattern”26 of racial conflict in America can be described as a
fundamental “contradiction of perspectives”27 on the nature and experience of racial

20

CORNEL WEST, DEMOCRACY MATTERS: WINNING THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALISM 6
(Penguin Books, 2004) (“The major culprit here is not “political correctness,” a term coined by those who
tend to trivialize the scars of others and minimize the suffering of victims while highlighting their own
wounds.”)
21
Id
22
Cite definition, see Tayyab
23
GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 88 (Harvard University Press,
2002) [hereinafter Loury, Anatomy]
24
Minow, Justice supra at 15
25
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK 141 (Little Brown Publishers, 2005)
26
Id
27
Frances V. Rains, Is the Benin Really Harmless? Deconstructing Some “Benign” Manifestations of
Operational White Privilege, in WHITE REIGN, supra at 80. (citing J.J. Scheurich, Toward a White
Discourse on White Racism, Educational Researcher 22, no. 8, 5-10 (1993))
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reality in America28 based not simply on the color of one’s skin, but rather on the color
and centeredness of one’s personal attitudinal perspective. As one scholar has argued,
the stark contrast between the nonwhite experiences and white opinions…stems…from
liberal individualism’s inability to describe adequately the collective dimensions of our
experiences.”29
Thus, the logic of this article suggests that the central racial paradox of the law in
the twenty-first century consists in reconciling what has been described as “the gap
between white perception and minority experience,”30 or the rival white-centered and
non-white-centered racialized perspectives regarding the nature of racial reality.
However, at the threshold of this paradox is a recognition of the antinomic relationship
between the white-centered and the non-white-centered perspectives on racial reality –
and thus the fact that there is something that must be reconciled. Achieving this goal will
require dislodging the white-centered-perspective from its current presumptive position
as the sole arbiter of racial reality.31 This is an essential threshold requirement because a
truly pluralistic society must not only recognize the rights of those categorized as
“different,” but it must also reflect a minimally acceptable degree of respect and dignity
for the perspectival differences that such status has created and perpetuated.32

28

Although the non-white perspective consists of multiple racialized subgroups that represent a black,
Latino, Asian, American Indian perspectives, what they all have in common is that they are not white.
Thus this article will generally refer to this grouping as the non-white perspective. However, particular
racial group perspectives will be identified where the context suggests it might be appropriate.
29
GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS, 20 (Temple University Press, 1998) [hereinafter Lipsitz,
Possessive Investment in Whiteness]
30
Id
31
See id, (noting the existence of a “broadly shared narrative about the victimization of “innocent” whites
by irrational and ungrateful minorities.”)
32
The logic of the argument advanced in this article is premised on the presumption that the whitecentered-perspective, is not only raced, but also gendered, classed, physically abled, and sexually oriented.
Thus it a perspective that reflects the experience of those who are white, male, middle class, fully abled,
and heterosexual. However, for purposes of this discussion, this article will focus primarily on the raced
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Thus as one group of scholars has concluded “at the center of the debate over race
in America is the question of what perspective we will use to define racism and the social
policies necessary to end it. From what vantage point will problems be named and
solutions found?”33 These are critically important concerns in contemporary America
because as Richard Delgado has presciently observed, “traditional legal writing purports
to be neutral and dispassionately analytical, but all too often it is not.”34 As Delgado goes
on to point out, part of the reason for this counterfeit neutrality is due to the fact that
“legal writers rarely focus on their own mindsets, the received wisdoms that serve as their
starting points.”35 This “starting point” that Delgado identifies is the ideological and
perspectival vantage point from which one sees, interprets, and makes sense of reality.
As this article suggests, these vantage points reflect the racing characteristics of the
society at large. It is critical that the law begin to recognize and understand the
perspectival monopoly that whiteness exerts on the Supreme Court’s view of racially
inflected cases because, “[t]he supposedly objective point of view” advanced by the
Court “often mischaracterizes, minimizes, dismisses, or derides without fully
understanding opposing viewpoints.”36 Moreover, such broad recognition is essential
because it is axiomatic that “only by acknowledging [the] profound differences in
[racialized] perspectives can one begin to address the durable racial inequality of
American society.”37

aspects of this perspective but it is important to keep in mind that this analysis could apply with equal
salience and force to any of the other aforesaid categories as well.
33
WHITE REIGN, supra at 64
34
Richard Delgado, Storytelling For Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV.
2411, 2440-2441 (1989)
35
Id
36
Id (“Implying that objective, correct answers can be given to legal questions also obscures the moral and
political value judgments that lie at the heart of any legal inquiry.”)
37
WHITE REIGN, supra at 64
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It is not surprising that race has such a profound effect on the perception of racial
reality because, as the nation was starkly reminded by the two contrasting pictures of the
New Orleans flood survivors,38 “Blacks continue to inhabit a very different America than
do whites.”39 As a result, “[p]eople’s perspectives on race reflect their experience on one
side of the color line or the other.”40 Thus, as shown in a revealing new study on white
male attitudes on race, “central to the thinking of the majority of whites, in regard
to…various racial matters is a constant and enduring approach to the social world that is
centered in and framed from a white-American perspective. It is not just that the racial
outgroup is viewed as culturally deficient; it is that the viewpoint on this matter is
consistently white-framed.”41
This distinction between white-centered and non-white-centered perspectives on
racial reality has rarely been recognized in the Court’s consideration of racial difference.
Instead the “legal treatment of difference…tends to treat as unproblematic the point of
view from which difference is seen, assigned, or ignored, rather than acknowledge that
the problem of difference can be described and understood from multiple points of
view.”42 More importantly, as Martha Minnow reminds us, the very existence of
“multiple viewpoints challenges the assumption of objectivity and shows how claims to

38

See Clarence Page, supra (“as the misery mounted, more TV broadcasters mentioned what viewers could
plainly see, that the vast majority of “refugees,” were black and poor.”); See also, Anna Mulrine, supra
(“Katrina’s lethal one-two punch of 145 mile-per-hour winds and 25-foot storm surge left 90,000 square
miles of heartbreak, devastation, and unhinged lives…[it] uprooted more Americans than the Civil War, the
Dust Bowl storms of the 1930’s or the San Francisco earthquake of 1906…this is our tsumani.”)
39
Flagg, supra Was Blind, But Now I See at 987
40
WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 35 (Brown, et. al. eds.)
(University of California Press, 2003 [hereinafter Brown, Whitewashing Race]
41

JOE FEAGIN & EILEEN O’BRIEN, WHITE MEN ON RACE: POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND THE
SHAPING OF CULTURAL CONSCIOUSNESS, 17-18 (Beacon Press, 2003) [hereinafter Feagin, White
Men on Race]
42
Minow, Justice supra at 14
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knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims.”43 Therefore it is important to
pay careful attention to the way in which the courts generally and the United States
Supreme Court in particular, treat the issues of racial difference and racial perspective in
the process of resolving racialized claims of constitutional rights.
The principal argument of this article is that in resolving competing racially
inflected claims to constitutional shelter, the Supreme Court’s racial perspective “is
unreflectively locked inside its own…limited…experience,”44 and as a consequence it
has consistently chosen to view racial reality through a “totally white prism” and thus has
adopted a distinctly white-centered perspective as the “master framework”45 or dominant
judicial gaze46 through which it evaluates racial reality in America.47 Moreover, this
article argues that the Court’s consistent choice of a white-centered perspective as the

43

Id (“There is no God’s Eye point of view that we can know or usefully imagine; there are only the
various points of view of actual persons reflecting various interests and purposes that their descriptions and
theories subserve.”) (citing H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 50 (1981); See also, T.
NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 7 (1986).
44
WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 35 (Brown, et. al. eds.)
(University of California Press, 2003 [hereinafter Brown, Whitewashing Race] (“any perspective that is
unreflectively locked inside its own experience is limited, and this is particularly so when that perspective
reflects the dominant culture.”)
45
Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy supra (Although all the races in a racialized social system have the
capacity to develop these frameworks, the frameworks of the dominant race become the master frameworks
against which all racial actors compare (positively or negatively) their ideological positions.”)
46
See CORNEL WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE! AN AFRO-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
CHRISTIANITY, (Westminster John Knox Press, (1982, 2002) [PROPHESY DELIVERANCE ] 49, 50,
55
The captivity of natural history to what I have called the “normative gaze” signifies the first stage of the
emergence of the idea of white supremacy as an object of modern discourse.” …the idea of white
supremacy emerges partly because of the powers within the structure of modern discourse—powers to
produce and prohibit, develop and delimit, forms of rationality, scientificity, and objectivity which set
perimeters and draw boundaries for the intelligibility, availability, and legitimacy of certain ideas. …the
controlling metaphors, notions, categories, and norms that shape the predominant conceptions of truth and
knowledge in the modern West.
But see, ANATOMY OF RACISM, supra (“the metaphors of racist discourse are not reducible to a single
form.”)
47
As a result, this unreflective judicial attitude has led the Court to consistently deny or ignore competing
non-white-centered viewpoints as legitimate bases for either interpreting or articulating the nature and
meaning of racial reality in America.

14

exclusive lens through which to resolve race based constitutional claims “cannot be
defended as principled, coherent or neutral.”48
The choice49 by America’s highest legal tribunal to adopt a white-centered
perspective as its default lens for evaluating and resolving racially inflected constitutional
claims is deeply troubling and problematic. In making this choice, the Court has
completely erased the non-white-centered perspective and not only allowed the whitecentered perspective to dominate its thinking, but also to present itself, not as the superior
alternative among competing views of reality, but rather as an objective, unraced, and
neutral judge of the real and the natural. 50
This white-centered judicial gaze on America’s racial reality is problematic for
both constitutional and policy reasons. Specifically, this article argues that at minimum,
from a constitutional perspective, whether the result of conscious or unconscious
motivations,51 the Court’s consistent choice of a white-framed or white-centered
perspective as the presumptive lens through which to understand and resolve
constitutional race based claims, constitutes a constitutionally impermissible racial

48

Geoffrey R. Stone, Rehnquist’s Legacy Doesn’t Measure Up, Chicago Tribune, September 6, 2005.
(editorial following the sudden death of the late Chief Justice Rehnquist regarding the Justice’s views on in
First Amendment cases that came before the Court during his tenure.)
49
The choice of the white perspective is masked in the myth of the absence of choice. However, whether it
is made consciously or unconsciously, a choice is still certainly being made. See also, Minnow, Justice
supra at 70 (“There is no neutrality, no escape from choice. But it is possible to develop better abilities to
name and grasp competing perspectives and to make more knowing choices…[which is] central to the
challenge of engendering justice. ”) See also infra Section _____ regarding the distinction between
conscious and unconscious choices.
50
MATTHEW FRY JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN
IMMIGRATION AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 10 (Harvard University Press, 1998) [hereinafter
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color] (“[t]he awesome power of race as an ideology resides precisely
in its ability to pass as a feature of the natural landscape.”).
51
See Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has
influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which these beliefs affect our actions. In other words,
a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious motivations.”);
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preference in favor of whiteness.52 Moreover, this article argues that this impermissible
racial preference also represents a one-sided,53 arbitrary, unprincipled, irrational,
capricious, and unexplained judicial choice in stark violation of the constitutional
guarantees of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and of Due Process
under both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. This article also concludes that the
Court’s consistent choice of a white-centered perspective to resolve race based
constitutional claims is constitutionally indefensible and must be unambiguously rejected
as the Court said in Loving v. Virginia, “as measures designed to maintain white
supremacy.”54
Moreover, more broadly, the Court’s choice of a controlling white-centered
perspective is also deeply distressing because as Martha Minnow reminds us, in a
pluristic society “[l]itigation in the Supreme Court should be an opportunity to endow
rival vantages points with the reality that power enables, to redescribe and remake the
meanings of difference in a world that has treated only some vantage points on difference
as legitimate.”55 Instead of providing a forum where rival racial vantage points can be
evaluated, measured, and can then compete for state recognition and support, the Court’s

52

The central problem with white-centered perspective is that the Court mistakes this perspective for the
real. It forgets that with respect to racial reality, the white-centered perspective is in dialectical and
antinomic opposition to the non-white perspective, in that both are in fact in themselves quite reasonable
given their respective starting points.

53

See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 368 (1995) (accusing Patricia Williams in writing The
Alchemy of Race and Rights, of “suppress[ing] every perspective other than that of the suffering,
oppressed black” and noting that “one-sidedness is an endemic risk of the literary depiction of reality,
rather than a particular characteristic of Patricia Williams.”) (reprinted in EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN,
ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS,
CASES AND MATERIALS 20-21 (Foundation Press, 2005)
54
388 U.S. 1 (1967)
55
Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10,
16, (1987-88) [hereinafter Minow, Justice]
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adoption of the white-centered perspective erases all rival vantage points56 and crowns
itself as the sole and undisputed interpreter of the nature and meaning of racial difference,
that amounts to “a compulsory gospel which admits of no dissent and no disobedience.”57
When the dominant ideology succeeds in controlling the Court’s interpretation
and understanding of reality it is thereby able to control the production of what passes for
knowledge. Moreover, it is able to do so in a manner that “may even shape the terms of
access for other points of view, so that exclusions appear natural, based on merit or on
standards endorsed even by those who remain excluded.”58
This article argues that the rhetorical narratives that the Court deploys to describe
everything from the parties, circumstances, and operative legal standards, in judging race
based claims to constitutional protection are more than mere neutral descriptors. Instead
because they are “determined within a social-cognitive matrix that is raced”59 they
therefore constitute rhetorical tools in the classic sense,60 which are meant to construct a
persuasive and particularized vision of racial reality. Moreover, they also “wrongly imply
a natural fit with the world”61 and attempt to persuade that they lack particularity of
perspective.

56

See Id at 53, (“a judicial stance that treats its own perspective as unproblematic makes other perspectives
invisible and puts them beyond discussion.”)
57
ERIC STOKES, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS AND INDIA, 302 (1959) (quoting Fitzjames
Stephen)
58
Ideological success is achieved when only dissenting views are regarded as ideologies; the
prevailing view is the truth. Those who win a given struggle for control have the best access to the
means of producing knowledge, such as the mass media and schools. …Historians have described
how a conception of reality, when it triumphs, convinces even those injured by it of its actuality.
Accordingly, political and cultural success itself submerges the fact that conceptions of reality
represent a perspective of some groups, not a picture of reality free from any perspective.
Minow, Justice supra at 67
GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 73 (Harvard University Press,
2002) [hereinafter Loury, Anatomy]
60
Cornel Rhetoric etc.
61
Minow, Justice supra at 14
59
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A central analytical support beam in the Court’s rationalization of the whitecentered-perspective is it’s use of the rhetoric of white innocence and its underlying
ideological scaffolding.62 For this reason, interrogating the meaning, significance, and
implications of the Court’s adoption of the white-centered perspective as its unstated and
exclusive measure of racial difference requires an interrogation of the relationship
between the ideology of white innocence and the dialectic of whiteness in the formation
of white identity. 63
This article examines the rhetoric of white innocence through two illustrative
examples in the law; first affirmative action, and second the Fourth Amendment. In the
case of affirmative action, this article will examine the Supreme Court’s use of the
rhetoric of white innocence as a substantive counterweight by which the constitutionality
of race conscious programs that benefit non-whites is measured. In the context of the
Fourth Amendment, this article will examine the Supreme Court’s use of the rhetoric of
white innocence and thereby racializing the constitutional content of the reasonable
person test in citizen police encounters.
This interrogation is divided into six sections. Section one examines the content of the
ideology of white innocence. Section two discusses the ideology of white innocence and
62

See Id (describing ideology as “something at once so think and so vaporous.”); See also, KARL
MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 36 (L. Wirth & E. Shils trans. 1936):
The concept of ‘ideology’ reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that
ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are simply
no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There is implicit in
the word ‘ideology’ that insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups
obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it.

63

See, Amanda E. Lewis, Some Are More Equal than Others: Lessons on Whiteness from School, in
WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM 165 (Ashley W. Doane and Eduardo
Bonilla-Silva, eds.) (Routledge, 2003) [hereinafter Lewis, Lessons on Whiteness] (“it is particularly
important to understand the parameters and functions of whiteness, [and] of what it means to say someone
is white.”)
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affirmative action by looking at the Court’s deployment of this ideology as a counterbalance with
which to measure the constitutionality of race conscious affirmative action programs. Section
Three considers the Court’s use of the ideology of white innocence in mediating the content of
the reasonable person test under the Fourth Amendment. Section Four examines some specific
constitutional concerns with white innocence. Section Five offers a number of recommendations
to disrupt the hegemonic grip of the Court’s rhetorical narrative of white innocence and supplant
it with a constitutional racial analytic that appreciates a wider variety of legitimate racial vantage
points or perspectives and thus a greater sense of racial reality in America and its relations with
the rest of the world community of non-white peoples. Section six offers a few concluding
remarks.
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I. The Ideology of White Innocence
In any analysis which critiques an important facet of whiteness it is important to
keep in mind the critical admonition articulated by historian David Roediger, that
whiteness is not merely a color, it is also ”an ideology” that was “developed out of
desires to rule and the exigencies of ruling.”64 This article argues that critical to this
ideology of whiteness are notions of white innocence that are sufficiently discrete to
constitute an independent, but also simultaneously interdependent ideology.65 Thus, the
ideology of white innocence is derivative from the ideology of whiteness and like
whiteness itself, it is “a peculiar institution,”66 that is a deeply schizophrenic and

64

DAVID R. ROEDIGER, COLORED WHITE: TRANSCENDING THE RACIAL PAST, (University of
California Press, 2002) 23 (“Perhaps the overarching theme in scholarship on whiteness is the argument
that white identity is decisively shaped by the exercise of power and the expectation of advantages in
acquiring property.”). See also, Lipsitz, Possessive Investment in Whiteness at viii (“I hope it is clear that
opposing whiteness is not the same as opposing white people. White supremacy is an equal opportunity
employer; nonwhite people can become active agents of white supremacy as well as passive participants in
its hierarchies and rewards.”)
65
See, Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy supra:
[i]deology consists of the broad mental and moral frameworks, or grids, that social groups use to
make sense of the world, to decide what is right and wrong, true or false, important or
unimportant. Although ideologies do not provide individuals, as group members, with an explicit
road map of how to act, what to believe and what to say, they furnish the basis principles
individuals use to sift through contested and often contradictory information in order to make
sense of social reality. …Ideologies are about meanings that express relations of domination.
See also, Alan Freeman, Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: A Critical Legal Essay,
23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 295 (1988) (“Central to my new array of insights was that law and rights
might be better understood not as functional, responsive and autonomous expressions of shared values or
emerging egalitarian norms, but instead as ideology.”); See also, Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy supra at
63 (“a more fruitful approach for examining individual racial views is the notion of racial ideology, or the
racially based frameworks used by actors to explain and justify (dominant race) or challenge (subordinate
race) the racial status quo.”).
66

Id at 137; See also, THEODORE ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE VOL. I, 1
(19___)
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inconsistent mix of both color blind and color conscious values, understandings, and
perspectives.67
Under the ideology of white innocence as conceived by this article there are four
principle ways in which whiteness reflects and reinscribes notions of innocence. First,
whiteness is regarded as innocent of race itself. Second, whiteness is considered to be
innocent of racial perspective. Third, whiteness insists that it is innocent of racism.
Fourth, whiteness argues that it is innocent of racial benefit from the legacy of American
racism.

A. The Innocence of Whiteness
As used in this article, whiteness can be understood as a “privileged strategic
location in a racialized social system…[whose] views, fears, and rationalizations take a
central position in the overall “ideological ensemble” of a society.”68 From this central
position in society, the essential principles of the ideology of white innocence strongly
correlate with what has variously been described as a “new racism,”69 or a “neo-con or

67

See, MATTHEW FRY JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN
IMMIGRATION AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE, 5 (Harvard University Press, 1998) [hereinafter
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color] (“The contest over whiteness – its definition, its internal
hierarchies, its proper boundaries, and its rightful claimants—has been critical to American culture
throughout the nation’s history, and it has been a fairly untidy affair.”)
68
EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, WHITE SUPREMACY AND RACISM IN THE POST-CIVIL
RIGHTS ERA, 62 (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001) [hereinafter Bonilla-Silva, White Supremacy] (noting
that the “ideological ensemble of a society” consists of “racial, class, and other forms of hierarchical
structurations…[and that] the focus [here is] exclusively on the racial aspects of the ideological ensemble.”)
id at 83 nt. 16.
69
Paul Finkelman, The Rise of the New Racism 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 245 (1996) [hereinafter
Finkelman, the New Racism] (describing the new racism as “a way of thinking that has become fashionable
and acceptable in some quarters [that] (1) denies the history of racial oppression in America; (2) rejects
biological racism in favor of an attack on black culture; and (3) supports formal, de jure equality.”) id at
247.

21

neo-confederate”70 racism, or a new “conservative racial realism.”71 For this reason, the
ideology of white innocence may either be deployed innocently out of ignorance or
strategically out of political calculation.72
Moreover, the essential principles of white innocence also strongly correlate with
the various major dictionary definitions of the term “innocence” generally. As a baseline
to interpret the Court’s use of the term “innocence” it is important to note that there are
four general definitions of the term innocence from which to choose. First, the term
innocence is primarily defined “in a narrow, even technical way”73 as simply the ‘absence
of guilt’ in the commission of a crime or offense.74 This is the primary, narrowest, and
most technical definition of the term innocence.75 It connotes a highly legalistic sense of
having been wrongly accused or adjudicated as guilty of some specifically charged crime
or offense. Second, “innocence can also take on a larger meaning that extends beyond
technicality into morality: freedom from sin, guilt, or moral wrong in general; the state of

70

PETER APPLEBOME, DIXIE RISING: HOW THE SOUTH IS SHAPING AMERICAN VALUES,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 136 (Harcourt Brace and Company, 1996)
71
WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY 1 (Brown, et. al. eds.)
(University of California Press, 2003) 6 [hereinafter Brown, Whitewashing Race] (describing the new
“racial realists” central organizing claims as consisting of:
three related claims: First, …racism is a thing of the past…the economic divide between whites and
blacks…is exaggerated, and white Americans have been receptive to demands for racial equality. [Their]
second claim is that persistent racial inequalities…cannot be explained by white racism. As they see it, the
problem is the lethargic, incorrigible, and often pathological behavior of people who fail to take
responsibility for their own lives, [and are] …attributable to the moral and cultural failure of African
Americans, not to discrimination. [Third], the civil rights movement’s political failures are caused by the
manipulative, expedient behavior of black nationalists and the civil rights establishment.
72

See Finkelman, supra New Racism
Harris, Innocence and the Soprano’s, supra at 577 (“freedom from specific guilt; the fact of not being
guilty of that which one is charged; guiltless.”)
74
The New Oxford American Dictionary at 875. [hereinafter, Oxford]The sense of innocence as being not
guilty or wrongfully accused is poignantly illustrated in the recent popularity of “innocence projects” which
have created all over the country.
75
Id
73
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being untainted with, or unacquainted with, evil; moral purity,”76 or of being ‘free of
responsibility’ or moral blameworthiness for something, yet nonetheless “suffering its
consequences.”77 The third alternative definition of innocence is understood to describe
those who are naïve, unaware, uninitiated, weak or vulnerable.78
As one scholar has observed, there is a fourth alternative definition of innocence
that, “conveys a larger idea that is more powerful and evocative than the former’s narrow
literalism.”79 In this larger and more expansive view, innocence “evokes the sleeping
infant, wholly dependant and pure of thought and deed. No avoidable harm can be
justifiably inflicted on this type of innocent.”80 In fact, this type of innocence imposes
“moral…demands” on others to “receive care and protection from harm.”81 Thus this
expansive moral dimension of innocence “is not a passive state” but rather “includes the
power to command others to action – that is, to require the care and protection of those
deemed innocent.”82

1. Innocent of Race
Despite the overwhelming rejection by the scientific and academic community of
the notion of biological racial essentialism83 and the widespread acceptance of race as

76

Harris, Innocence and the Soprano’s, supra at 577 (citing the Oxford English Dictionary 995 (2d ed.
1989) (“It bestows no special legal status. Yet, it is a positive attribute with normative consequences.”)id.
77
Oxford, supra.
78
Id
79
Seth D. Harris, Innocence and the Sopranos, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 577, 577 (2004-5)
80
Id
81
Id.
82
Id. (noting that this expansive form of innocence leads the Court to “afford…almost parental care and
protection appropriate only for the sleeping infant who exemplifies the broader, moral definition of
innocence.”) id at 580
83
See, Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33 (defining racial essentialism “as the assumption that social
differences such as those between men and women, people of different races, or social classes are due to
intrinsic biological or psychic differences…[that] are believed to be innate and unchanging.”)
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nothing more than a social construct,84 from a white-centered perspective the ideology of
white innocence reflects a continuing sense of real, socially meaningful, essential, and
biological differences between differently raced peoples. As one scholar has noted, the
white-centered perspective tends “to think of race as being indisputable, real. It frames
our notions of kinship and descent and influences our movements in the social world; we
see it plainly on one another’s faces. From this perspective race somehow still seems to
be a product not of the social imagination but of biology.”85
This biological view of race has been advanced and perpetuated in one form or
another for the last one hundred and fifty years,86 under the banner of scientific racism.87
This so-called scientific school of thought argued that “each race had an essence
distinguishing it from other races and accounting for its inferiority or superiority,”88
and has a tragic and bloody history. This view provided the foundation not only for Jim
Crow segregation,89 lynching,90 and profound white violence in America,91 but also

84

cite
Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color supra at 1
86
See id, supra (“Since the eighteenth century, racist beliefs have been built upon scientific racial
categorizations and the linking of social and cultural traits to supposed genetic racial difference.”)
87
See, Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33 (“The history of racial categorizations is intertwined with the
history of racism. Science sought to justify a priori racist assumptions and consequently rationalized and
greatly expanded the arsenal of racist ideology.”)
88
Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33 (noting that this view “molded both scientific and popular
conceptions of race from Reconstruction until World War I, giving rise to social Darwinism and
eugenics…[which] argued, conveniently, that natural selection was at work in the social world and that
success was dependant upon one’s fitness.”) id at 32
89
See id, supra at 33 (“The entire Jim Crow system of discrimination and strict segregation was supported
by widespread, commonly held scientific assumptions about the permanence of racial essences, the extent
to which race determines social and cultural behavior, and the danger of miscegenation.”)
90
See, GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN
THE SOUTH, 1890-1940, 199 et seq. (Pantheon Books, 1998) [hereinafter Hale, Making Whiteness]
(describing the rapid rise and enormous and widespread popularity of spectacle lynching in the South) ; See
also, LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW
(Knopf, New York, 1999) 280 et. seq. (describing the extreme savagery, barbarity, violence, and popularity
of spectacle lynchings. For example, “But the crowd had not finished. Throwing the body into a fire, they
watched with astonishing coolness and nonchalance as it burned. Finally, the relic hunters moved in to
retrieve portions of the rope and what was left of the charred body.”) (citing Ida B. Wells, Lynch Law, in
85
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furnished the intellectual justification for the infamous genocidal “sterilization and
extermination policies in the name of racial purification,”92 pursued by Nazi Germany
that claimed the lives of six million Jews, 93 at least as many racially undesirable others,
and plunged the globe into its second world war of almost unimaginable carnage.
However, despite this infamous pedigree, notions of scientific racism have exhibited a
remarkable “staying power [as]… attested to [by] the recent publication of the Bell
Curve,”94 and its widespread popularity. However, from the non-white-centered
perspective “[w]hile the history of the scientific concept of race argues that race is an
inherent essence, it reveals, on the contrary, that race is a social construct.”95 The deepseated white-centered notion of racial essentialism “cannot be supported” because “while
our commonsense assumptions may tell us that race is rooted in biology, biologists today
reject such notions.”96

i. Personal White Identity

THE REASON WHY THE COLORED AMERICAN IS NOT IN THE WORLDS COLUMBIAN
EXPOSITION, AT 30-33)
91
See, HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM
RECONSTRUCTION TO MONTGOMERY, 10 (University of Massachusetts Press, 1988) [hereinafter
Shapiro, White Violence] (noting the widespread violence, murder and arson committed by whites on
blacks during Reconstruction. “Violence and…the threat of violence…blocked access to education, denied
entrance to trades, or prevented land ownership undermined black efforts to realize the American
Dream…[the] three avenues …most commonly traveled by other Americans in their quest for self
advancement.”)
92
Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33.
93
See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (Vintage Books, 1996); See also, GITTA SERENY, INTO THAT
DARKNESS: AN EXAMINATION OF CONSCIENCE, (Vintage Books, 1974).
94
Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33
95
Id
96
Id at 19 (“Racial categories lack any scientific foundation; there is greater genetic variety within racial
groups than between them, and racial classifications vary both cross-culturally and historically.”)
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Moreover, the claim of whiteness as a form of personal identity97 is a relatively
recent historical phenomenon98 and is heavily “veiled in value.”99 This notion of a
personal white identity is also a uniquely Western100 conflation of diverse European
national ethnicities into a relatively recent, and socially constructed race based claim of
group identity.101 Additionally, this is not a positive claim about what one is, but rather a
claim grounded in negation based on what one is not.102 This is because to claim to be

97

See West, supra West Reader at 501 (“Identity has to do with protection, association and recognition.
People identify themselves in certain ways in order to protect their bodies, their labor, their communities,
their way of life; in order to be associated with people who ascribe value to them, who take them seriously,
who respect them; and for purposes of recognition, to be acknowledged, to feel as if one actually belongs to
a group.”)
98
Cite
99
David Theo Goldberg, The Social Formation of Racist Discourse, in ANATOMY OF RACISM, (David
Theo Goldberg, ed.) 301 (University of Minnesota Press, 1990) (“The seemingly naked body of pure facts
is veiled in value.”)
100
See RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTUCTION
OF WHITENESS, 265 nt. 2 (University of Minnesota Press, 1993) (“West and Western are relational terms
constructed out of opposition to non-Western Others or Orientals. Westerness implies a particular,
dominative relationship to power, colonial expansion, a belonging to center rather than margin in a global
capitalist system, and a privileged relationship to institutions…for the production of knowledge.”)
101
See Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 33 (While the history of the scientific concept of race argues
that race is an inherent essence, it reveals, on the contrary, that race is a social construct.”); See also, West,
supra West Reader at 503. In a chapter entitled “On Black – Brown Relations” in a conversation between
Cornel West and Jorge Klor de Alva, Professor de Alva observes that:
We have in the United States, two mechanisms at play in the construction of collective identities. One is to
identify folks from a cultural perspective. The other is to identify them from a racial perspective. Now,
with the exception of black-white relations, the racial perspective is not the critical one for most folks. The
cultural perspective was, at one time, very sharply drawn, including the religious line between Catholics
and Protestants, Jews and Protestants, Jews and Catholics, Jews and Christians. But in the twentieth
century, we have seen in the United States a phenomenon that we do not see anyplace else in the world –
the capacity to blur the differences between these cultural groups, to construct them in such a way that they
become insignificant and to fuse them into a new group called whites, which didn’t exist before.
(Cornel West responds by noting that “part of the tragedy of American civilization is precisely the degree
to which the stability and continuity of American democracy has been predicated on a construct of
whiteness that includes the subordination of black people, so that European cultural diversity could
disappear into American whiteness while black folk remain subordinated.”) id.
102

See, Tayyab Mahmud, Class in LatCrit: Theory and Praxis in a World of Economic Inequality (LatCrit
V Symposium) 78 UNIV. DENVER L.REV. 657, 661 (2001):
modern universality rests upon a conceptual partitioning and corresponding transformation of human
populations into a divide between, as Jean-Paul Sartre put it, “men” and “natives.” The canonical darkskinned savage, constituted as the not-quite-human Other, furnished the grounds to constitute the universal
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white necessarily implies a claim of racial purity.103 It is effectively a claim104 of being
free from even “one drop” of black or African blood in one’s ancestral chain of racial
title.105 In short, a claim of personal whiteness is tantamount to a claim of being innocent
of blackness.

subject of modernity, i.e. the civilized rights-bearing European. In this maneuver, one can see in operation
ostensive self-definition by negation, the assumption of identity by reference to what one is not.
(citing Jean-Paul Sartre, Preface to FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 38, (Grove
Press, 1963). See also, V.G. KIERNANA, THE LORDS OF HUMAN KIND: BLACK MAN, YELLOW
MAN, AND WHITE MAN IN AN AGE OF EMPIRE (1969)
103

See ABBY L. FERBER, WHITE MAN FALLING: RACE, GENDER, AND WHITE SUPREMACY,
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998) 34, 33 (“From the moment the concept of race was invented,
interracial sexuality became a concern. Historically, the preoccupation with defining who is white and who
is black superseded concern with defining other nonwhites. The history of slavery and Jim Crow
segregation depended upon firm knowledge of who was white and black for their support…the project of
defining races always involves drawing and maintaining boundaries between the races.”); See also id
(Regarding the “tragedy of miscegenation…Every form of political and economic equality for blacks was
depicted as a threat to white racial purity, responded to with fears of interracial sexuality, and argued
against on that basis.”) id at 41.
104
Such contemporary claims, although common among those who consider themselves to be white, are
inherently unprovable beyond more than two or three generations in the vast majority of cases. Thus at
best, in many such cases these claims rest on little more than a mere hunch, a hope, and a prayer based on
the perceived white physical characteristics of only a few generations.
105
See Ferber, White Man Falling supra at 23 (“the historical construction of the opposition white/black
involves defining the limits of whiteness and blackness and defining precisely who qualifies as white and
who qualifies as black. In order to produce whiteness a stable, natural, given identity, the boundaries of
whiteness must be specified and secured.”) also at23, 35(“In order to racially classify the population…laws
label[ed] the fraction of black blood necessary to deem an individual black. …Increasingly, states moved
even further toward the one-drop rule, which defined as black all those with one discernable drop of black
blood.”); See also, id at 43 (“While a great deal has changed over the past three decades, the one drop rule
is still generally accepted, and interracial unions remain controversial and uncommon.”); See also, id at 41
(noting that interracial black/white marriages are still relatively rare “While the rate of black-white
intermarriage increased 63 percent between 1960-1970, such marriages consistently represent only 1 to 2
percent of all marriages.”) See also West, supra West Reader at 501 (“In the United States this
unwillingness to challenge what has come to be known as the one-drop rule—wherein anyone who ever
had an African ancestor, however remote, is identifiable only as black—has…trap[ped]…so-called people
of color, in a social basement with no exit ladders.”). See also, STEPHEN THERNSTROM AND
ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE
(Simon and Schuster, 1997) (“It is startling that until 1989 our birth registration rules provided that the
child of a white husband and a black wife counted as “black,” and so, too, did the child of a black husband
and a white wife. It was the “one drop of blood” rule: a trace of black blood and you were black.”); and
Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in Race-Conscious Law, 82
CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994) Noting that:
From 1950 to 1989, …the federal guidelines…used in making birth certificate race-identification records
[were] outlined …by …the National Center for Health Statistics…included a procedure for determining the
race of a child from the self-reported race of the parents. In the case of mixed parentage where only one
parent was white, the child was assigned to the other parent’s race. When neither parent was white, the
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Because by definition claims of personal whiteness necessarily invoke claims of
purity they therefore require constant attention to “policing the borders [and]
maintenance of the boundaries between one’s own kind and others.”106 This is true
because, as Iris Marion Young has observed, “any move to define an identity, a closed
totality, always depends on excluding some elements, separating the pure from the
impure…the logic of identity seeks to keep those borders firmly drawn.”107 The thrust of
this “boundary maintenance”108 has taken the form of legal and social prohibitions
designed to suppress “interracial sexuality and the births of mulattoes” because this
“represented boundary crossings that were widely perceived as threatening otherwise
stable racial boundaries.”109
Thus, a claim of personal whiteness is not only paradoxically a claim of being
“pure” or uncontaminated by blackness, but also of actually transcending race or being
innocent of race itself. However, this transcendence notwithstanding, most people who
regard themselves as white,110 are deeply invested in their whiteness, because it is “an
identity that provides them with resources, power, and opportunity.”111 However,

child was assigned to the race of the father. One notable characteristic is that any coupling between Whites
and non-Whites was deemed to produce non-White children. White racial status could only be removed by
inter-group parentage, never gained.
106

Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 23
Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in FEMINISM/
POSTMODERNISM 303 (Linda J. Nicholson, ed) (Routledge, 1990)
108
Ferber, White Man Falling, supra at 23
109
Id
110
DAVID R. ROEDIGER, COLORED WHITE: TRANSCENDING THE RACIAL PAST, 124
(University of California Press, 2002) (noting that “a substantial African American tradition [exists] that
regards terror and complicity in terror as the glue binding together those who think that they are white.”)
111
GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: HOW WHITE PEOPLE
PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS, 1 (Temple University Press, 1998) [hereinafter Lipsitz, Possessive
Investment in Whiteness] at vii (“this whiteness is, of course, a delusion, a scientific and cultural fiction
that like all racial identities has no valid foundation in biology or anthropology. Whiteness is, however, as
social fact, an identity created and continued with all-too-real consequences for the distribution of wealth,
prestige, and opportunity.”) id.
107
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despite this investment, they are also simultaneously schizophrenically deeply in denial
regarding the racially contingent basis of their identity. This is especially true because,
just as men have difficulty imagining themselves “as having gendered identities,”112
many whites have similar difficulty seeing themselves as raced and thus having racial
identities in American society.
Thus, most whites are conditioned not to view themselves in racial terms; instead
they believe that “race is something that doesn’t affect whites.”113 Under this logic, race
is something that affects racial minorities like blacks, Latinos, Asians, or American
Indians, but not whites.114 Thus whiteness and its attendant privileges is something that
members of the “dominant group [are] taught not to see.”115 As a result, even though
whites “enjoy unearned skin privilege” merely from being identified in society as
white,116 they “have been conditioned into oblivion about its existence [and are] unable to
see that it puts [them] ahead in any way… overrewarding… and yet also paradoxically
damaging [them.]”117 As Richard Dyer has poignantly observed “[a]s long as race is
something only applied to non-white peoples, as long as white people are not racially
seen and named, they/we function as a human norm. Other people are raced, we are just
people.”118
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McIntosh, White Privilege supra at 296
MELANIE E. L. BUSH, BREAKING THE CODE OF GOOD INTENTIONS: EVERYDAY FORMS
OF WHITENESS, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004)
114
Lewis, Lessons on Whiteness, supra at 165 (noting that most whites do “not have a coherent or selfconscious identity as a white person. As far as [they are] concerned, race was about others.”); See also, id
at 161 (“many whites do not necessarily recognize their own status as a racial actors or consciously identify
as belonging to a racial group.”)
115
Id at 292
116
See Plessy v. Ferguson, (discussing the value of a reputation for being white)
117
Id at 292; See also Anthony Farley…
118
RICHARD DYER, WHITE 1 (Routledge, 1997) (“to say that one is interested in race has come to mean
that one is interested in any racial imagery other than that of white people. Yet race is not only attributable
to people who are not white.”)
113
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As a consequence of whites not seeing themselves as being raced within Western
culture, as standing for the “human norm,” they are thereby able to “claim to speak for
the commonality of humanity.”119 The claim of whiteness to speak for all of humanity is
sui generis because “raced people can’t do that – they can only speak for their race. But
non-raced people can, for they do not represent the interest of a race.”120 Whiteness is
thus thought of as coterminous with being “just human…[or] just people…which is not
far off saying that whites are people whereas other colours are something else…[and] is
endemic to white culture.”121 Because most whites see themselves as just people without
a conscious racial identity, this gives rise to a sense of being innocent of race that is
uncomfortably disturbed when they are reminded that they are white. As Dyer points out,
“bell hooks, for instance, has noted how amazed and angry white liberals become when
attention is drawn to their whiteness, when they are seen by non-white people as
white.”122
ii. White is a Color Too
Despite white denials of being an unraced norm, the hard truth is that they are
clearly raced within Western culture because “everyone in this social order has been
constructed in our political imagination as a racialised subject.”123 Thus in order to
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Id at 2
Id
121
Id
122
Id at 2-3 (“often their rage erupts because they believe that all ways of looking that highlight difference
subvert the liberal belief in a universal subjectivity (we are all just people) that they think will make racism
disappear. They have a deep emotional investment in the myth of ‘sameness’, even as their actions reflect
the primacy of whiteness as a sign informing who they are and how they think.”) (citing BELL HOOKS,
Madonna or Soul Sister? And Representations of Whiteness in the Black Imagination, in BLACK LOOKS:
RACE AND REPRESENTATION 167 (South End Press, 1992)
123
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disrupt the hegemony of whiteness,124 it is necessary to “see” it as a racialised socially
constructed identity and to “make visible…the invisibility of whiteness as a racial
position in white (which is to say dominant) discourse.”125 In the absence of such
disruption, the “racial position” of whiteness will continue to be “the white point in space
from which we tend to identify difference,”126 or the “vantage point”127 from which all
things are judged and measured.
As Richard Dyer reminds us, “indeed, to say that one is interested in race has come to
mean that one is interested in any racial imagery other than that of white people. Yet race is not
only attributable to people who are not white, nor is imagery of non-white people the only racial
imagery.”128 Non-whites are not the only people who are raced in American culture. White is a
color too, although it has become so ubiquitous that it has become invisible. Thus Dyer argues
that, “everyone in this social order has been constructed in our political imagination as a
racialized subject and thus…we should consider whiteness as well as blackness,” as racialized
colors “in order to make visible what is rendered invisible when viewed as the normative state of
existence: the white point in space from which we tend to identify difference.”129
The power of “the invisibility of whiteness as a racial position in white (that is to say
dominant) discourse is of a piece with its ubiquity” and allows whites to be seen as not as raced
peoples, but rather as just as people outside of a socially raced perspective or as “the norm, the
ordinary, the standard…[but] precisely because of …their placing as norm they seem not be
represented to themselves as whites but as people who are variously gendered, classed,
124
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sexualized and abled.” Dyer thus concludes that “at the level of racial representation…whites
are not of a certain race, they’re just the human race…and speak for humanity”130 Moreover, “as
long as whiteness is felt to be the human condition, then it alone both defines normality and fully
inhabits it.”131

2. Innocent of Racial Perspective
Since most whites “do not conceive of themselves in racialized terms” they
consider their perspective to be an equally unraced and objective report of reality,
especially racial reality. Moreover, since whiteness sees itself as the norm, logically nonwhites “are defined as deviating from the norm.”132 Thus whiteness sees itself as the real
and non-whites as somehow not real or certainly less real. Under this logic, since whites
are the only “real” people, it follows that their perceptions of racial reality are the only
real ones real as well.
Since most whites are paradoxically simultaneously both keenly aware of their
whiteness, and deeply oblivious to it, they see their whiteness not as a raced condition but
as the norm. As Peggy McIntosh reminds us, “whites are taught to think of themselves as
morally neutral; normative, and average, and also ideal.”133 Similarly Richard Dyer
concludes that “[f]or those in power in the West, as long as whiteness is felt to be the
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human condition, then it alone both defines normality and fully inhabits it” and in this
way “secures a position of power.”134
This socially constructed racial identity of being real, forms what Peggy McIntosh
has described as “a base of unacknowledged …unearned…skin privilege” which she
describes as being “like an invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions,
assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, passports, visa, clothes, compass, emergency
gear, and blank checks.”135 Because these privileges of whiteness are unspoken they are
invisible,136 but nonetheless palpably clear and real and constitutive of a racially and
“arbitrarily conferred dominance.”137 However, both whiteness and the ideology of white
innocence are in plain sight while also simultaneously totally invisible. This paradoxical
racial phenomenon is not new. As George Lipsitz reminds us, “whiteness is everywhere
in U.S. culture, but it is very hard to see.”138 This is because, “white power secures its
dominance by seeming not to be anything in particular. As the unmarked category against
which difference is constructed, whiteness never has to speak its name, never has to
acknowledge its role as an organizing principle in social and cultural relations.” 139
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This seeming invisibility of whiteness allows the Court to deploy the rhetorical
narrative of white innocence as a kind of “semantic code”140 that supplies a moral armor
thorough which the Court can appear to measure constitutionality under what seem to be
praiseworthy and ostensibly racially neutral standards, but which are in reality, deeply
racialized. This is true because not only does the analysis proceed exclusively from the
white vantage point, but the standards the Court adopts also serve to protect, perpetuate,
and rationalize the existing extreme disequilibrium of power, wealth, and access to the
good things in life under the racial status quo.141 Thus, white innocence constitutes a
type of magic amulet contained in McIntosh’s “invisible weightless knapsack”142 of
white privilege, with which whites can ward off the dark forces of responsibility for the
creation, and perpetuation, of the many inequalities, burdens, and benefits of the racial
status quo in contemporary America.
Thus, through this rhetorical narrative, the presumption of white racial innocence
constitutes an important, obvious, but also, an effectively hidden pillar of the racial status
quo that Cass Sunstein calls “the baseline for assessing neutrality.”143 From this
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perspective any disturbance in the existing racial prerogatives, preferences, and
advantages of so-called innocent whites as a group, is regarded as a “departure from the
status quo” and thus “signals partisanship” while “respect for [this] status quo signals
neutrality.”144 As a result, the white-centered perspective is able to claim that it does not
have a racial vantage point, and in so doing continues to “perpetuate the mythology of the
neutral observer.”145
Similar to Sunstein’s observations, Martha Minow observes that the “unstated
assumption” of a white racialized standpoint of the status quo can “so entrench one point
of view as natural and orderly that any conscious decision to notice or to ignore
difference breaks the illusion of a legal world free of perspective.”146 Like Sunstein,
Minow also argues that these unstated and deeply racialized assumptions “make it seem
that departures from unstated norms violate commitments to neutrality. Yet adhering to
the unstated norms undermines commitments to neutrality – and to equality.”147
But of course, the hard truth is that whiteness is not a racially neutral lens
thorough which to gaze at the world of racial reality. Instead, whiteness has a distinct
racialized “standpoint [or] location from which to see [itself] others, and national and
global others.”148 Failing to acknowledge the “unstated assumption” of this white
standpoint, or the “white point in space” that constitutes the source of the white vantage
point, has highly negative consequences. As Martha Minow has observed, “[v]eiling the
standpoint of the observer conceals its impact on our perception of the world…[and]
144
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leads to the next unstated assumption: that all other perspectives are either presumptively
identical to the observer’s own or are irrelevant.”149 This is particularly important in the
context of the judicial function because, as Minow goes on to explain, “a judicial stance
that treats its own perspective as unproblematic makes other perspectives invisible and
puts them beyond discussion.”150

3. Innocent of Racism
From the white-centered perspective, racism in America is considered to be such
an artifact of America’s ancient past that it has moved one commentator, speaking from
that vantage point to claim that “the blood of slavery does not stain modern mainstream
America.”151 Thus freed from the “stain” of slavery, some scholars have argued that
white racial attitudes in America have improved and “transformed” so dramatically that
although “[w]hites with a pathological hatred of African Americans can still be
found…the haters have become a tiny remnant with no influence in any important sphere
of American life.”152 As a result, a significant theme among scholars who speak from a
white-centered-perspective is the conclusion that, “at least when it comes to questions of
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public policy, few whites are now racists.”153 From this perspective most whites are no
longer guilty of racism, thus with the exception of a few fringe outliers they – and thus
whiteness itself -- must also logically therefore be considered innocent of racism.

i. A Discredited View of Racism
From this perspective the continuing presence of “racial incidents demonstrate”
not the presence of societal racism but rather simply confirms that a few isolated “bigots
and institutional failures still exist; however, they do not indicate that racism is a
systemic problem.”154 Significantly this view of the innocence of whiteness is only
possible through the filtering of “evidence and …judgment through an outdated,
discredited understanding of racism.” This discredited view is premised on the
assumption that racism in contemporary America consists of acts which are “intentional,
obvious and individual.”155 This view is based on “a particular understanding of
racism…[that] assumes that racism is motivated, crude, explicitly supremacist and
typically expressed as individual bias. Moreover, this view regards racism to be the
result of intentional individual behavior that is both conscious and knowing in order to
satisfy a personal racial animus and taste for discrimination that are manifested by either
formal or explicit barriers to access based on racial categorization. This view ignores the
fact that “white supremacy is usually less a matter of direct, referential, and snarling
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contempt than a system for protecting the privileges of whites by denying communities of
color opportunities for asset accumulation and upward mobility.”156

ii. The End of Racism
Through the white-centered perspective, a great many whites and non-whites have
adopted a form of American color blindness that holds that “except for vestigial pockets
of historical racism, any possible connection between past racial subordination and the
present situation has been severed by the formal repudiation of old race-conscious
policies.”157 These modern “apostles” in the faith of colorblindness thus advocate a
perspective on race that “insists that racism is primarily a thing of the past.”158
Thus, “those who adhere to this color-blind view typically assume that racial
discrimination is much less frequent today and what remains is basically a problem of a
few bigoted individuals and not of social institutions.”159 From this white-centered
vantage point, white innocence defines racism as primarily consisting of individual acts
by rogue whites exiting on the fringe of mainstream society.160 Thus central to the
ideology of white innocence is the notion that with the exception of this “tiny
minority…of racist hotheads…who occupy political space only on the fringes of
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mainstream white America…racism has been eradicated” by the actions of civil rights
laws that stuck down “legal segregation and outlaw[ed] discrimination.”161
The elimination of these formal barriers to racial equality has spawned a cult of
“color blindness” in which the presumed “race neutrality of the legal system creates the
illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible for the condition of the
Black underclass.”162 Instead, the continuance of racial equality is no longer blamed on
the biological racial inferiority of non-whites but rather on their cultural inferiority.163
Although as George Fredrickson reminds us, “culture can be reified and essentialized to
the point where it has the same deterministic effect as skin color.”164
Similarly, not only do most whites consider themselves to be personally innocent
of racism, but in national terms recent surveys reveal that “a majority of whites indicate
that they do not see U.S. society as fundamentally racist or still pervaded by widespread
discrimination.”165 In fact, “from this perspective, many whites believe that the 1960’s
civil rights laws took care of most serious racial discrimination…[and] the majority of
whites see the U.S. social system as fair and egalitarian, and some get angry that black
Americans do not see the country in the same way.”166 Thus, “a majority of whites
indicate in surveys that they sincerely believe that racial discrimination is no longer a
161
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serious problem for black Americans.”167 Not only to most whites think that racial
discrimination against blacks is largely a thing of the past, “[e]ven more striking, perhaps
is the fact that a majority of whites do not see the centuries of slavery and segregation as
bringing whites substantial socioeconomic benefits.”168
This white-centered view of the nature of racism reflects what Alan Freeman has
characterized as a move from a “victim perspective” to a “perpetrator perspective”169 As
the labels imply, the victim perspective was focused on the injury or loss suffered by the
victims of racial discrimination. However, he argues that the perpetrator perspective
“means looking at contested race issues from the vantage point of whites,” thus the
“perpetrator perspective in law, like the conservatives’ understanding of racism, is
preoccupied with white guilt or innocence.”170 The perpetrator perspective of course,
reinforces the notion that racism is primarily a function of individual actors, who can be
found and punished, rather than reflecting on the institutional and systemic racial norms
of society.
The normative quality of this perpetrator perspective was clearly evidenced in
Croson when O’Connor argued that there was no “strong basis in evidence for its
conclusion that remedial action was necessary,” because the “the city points to no
evidence that qualified minority contractors have been passed over for city contracts or
subcontracts, either as a group or in any individual case.”171 On this basis Justice
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O’Connor concluded that “[p]roper findings in this regard are necessary to define both
the scope of the injury and the extent of the remedy necessary to cure its effects. Such
findings are also serve to assure all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal
treatment of all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the
service of the goal of equality itself.”172 Thus O’Connor reinforces the ideology of the
perpetrator perspective by insisting that the “norm” is “equal treatment of all racial
groups” absent a “finding” of a specific non-white contractor that has been discriminated
against by the old boy network of white contractors. Under O’Connor logic, in the
absence finding a bad actor or guilty perpetrator who had discriminated against a nonwhite contractor, she assumed that the “normal” operation of the system of state
contracting was one that respected the “equal treatment of all racial and ethnic groups.”173
iii. The Continuing Centrality of Racism
However, in stark contrast, when viewed from a non-white-centered perspective
racism is neither a thing of the past nor the product of isolated and individual rogue
bigots or guilty perpetrators. Instead, from a non-white-centered perspective racism is
considered to be still “deeply entrenched in this polity and defines the institutions of this
country, not so much by being an exception to the general rule of fairness, but rather by
being central to the polity’s very understanding of fairness, justice, and virtue.”174
Moreover, in further stark contrast to the white-centered perspective, from the
non-white centered perspective, equal racial treatment is not the “norm.” Instead, it
regards racism not as an extraordinary malfunction, but rather as a fundamental feature of
172
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society that is reflected not simply in the acts of individual whites but also, and most
importantly, in the very structures and institutions of the society itself. From this
perspective, this sort of institutional racism is not an exceptional occurrence that exists
only on the fringes of mainstream American society, but rather lies at the very heart of
the system. This view considers racism to be the function of systemic forces within
society and its institutions that operate silently, seamlessly, and incessantly to privilege
whites and burden non-whites, without the need for any intentional behavior by specific
racist individual actors. In short, from the non-white-centered-perspective, racism is not
an exceptional act of individual, rogue, bad actors, but is a normative and endemic
feature of the very structure of the status quo.
Moreover, from the non-white-centered-perspective racism is a phenomenon that
can operate either, consciously or unconsciously.175 In fact, from this perspective the
unconscious operation of racism constitutes it’s most ubiquitous and common
manifestation within personal, institutional and societal contexts and constitutes a
discursive process that operates in the absence of formal and explicit racial restrictions in
order to lower the barriers to access for whites and raise them for non-whites.
Thus through its reliance on the white-centered perspective, the ideology of white
innocence reflects a set of “shared narratives and ideologies,” through which “federal
courts have mythically transformed systemic racism into an individualism” that reflects
the availability of “choices [that] most people of color do not have.”176 Again, as
implicated in the opening lines of this article, from the non-white-centered perspective
175
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the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in the summer of 2005 provided stark evidence of the
continuing salience of race in America. This is poignantly and tragically illustrated by the
fact that over one hundred thousand people, mostly black and poor were left behind
during the evacuation of New Orleans because their abject poverty deprived them of any
ready means to leave before the city was virtually destroyed by the greatest natural
disaster in American history.177
Moreover, as the nation watched the horror unfolding daily on their television
screens, day after day tens of thousands of poor blacks were left to fend for themselves in
the ravaged aftermath of the storm, without food, water, medical help, or security.178 In
the nightmare and human tragedy that an inundated and devastated New Orleans had
become after this incredible disaster, we will never know how many poor blacks died or
suffered serious injury waiting for government rescue that either never came, or came too
late.179 In short, while it may not have been clear to many before the flood, it certainly
was clear afterward that in many ways “blacks live in a different world from whites.”180
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As starkly summarized by Professor Addis “put simply, while most whites see
racism as an occasional unfortunate interruption to the institutional and individual
commitments to the values of equal opportunity and equal treatment, most blacks see
racism as a daily routine by which the lives of black people are systematically and
institutionally devalued.”181 Moreover, he argues that “the very breadth of this
devaluation suggests that the institutions of this country are interlinked and that they
recycle the process of devaluation.”182

4. Innocent of Perpetuating or Benefiting from Racism
From the white-centered perspective, the current disproportionate social,
economic, and political benefits enjoyed by whites are direct reflections of individual
merit and hard work. This vantage point does not admit any contemporary role or
influence for America’s long history of officially sanctioned racial subordination. One
group of scholars has pointed out that it is striking “that a majority of whites do not see
the centuries of slavery and segregation as bringing whites substantial socioeconomic
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benefits.”183 Thus, from this perspective whiteness is thought of as being innocent of
having derived any contemporary benefit from racism.
This aspect of the ideology of white innocence is vividly expressed in the early
writings of Judge Anton Scalia, prior to joining the High Court and Judge Robert Posner.
In their analysis, white innocence appears to have two distinct and inter-related
components. First, whites are innocent to the extent that they took “no part in” either the
creation or the “perpetuation” of the historic domination and subordination of non-white
and especially Black people. Second, white innocence is a function of whites “deriving
no profit” or “in any demonstrable sense benefit[ing]” from the existence of
discrimination and subordination.
Prior to joining the Supreme Court, Justice Anton Scalia addressed the meaning
of innocence in “forcefully articulate[ing] the objections to – and the resentment of – the
compensatory justification of affirmative action.”184 In describing how his own father
was racially innocent, he also articulated his sense of a working definition of white
innocence that evoked the personal absence of participation in or receipt of benefits from
the condemned activity. He wrote that:
“My father came to this country when he was a teenager. Not only had he never
profited from the sweat of any black man’s brow, I don’t think he’d ever seen a black
man. There are, of course, many white ethnic groups that came to this country in
great numbers relatively late in its history – Italians, Jews, Poles – who not only took
no part in, derived no profit from, the major historic suppression of the currently
acknowledged minority groups, but were in fact themselves the object of
discrimination by the dominant Anglo-Saxon majority. To be sure, in relatively
recent years some or all of these groups have been the beneficiaries of discrimination
against blacks, or have themselves practiced discrimination, but to compare their
racial debt…with that of those who plied the slave trade, and who maintained a
183
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formal caste system for many years thereafter, is confuse a mountain with a
molehill.”185
As Professor Fiscus points out, Richard Posner, “made essentially the same
argument…less passionate than Scalia but no less logical,” when he wrote that “the
members of minority groups who receive preferential treatment will often be those who
have not been the victims of discrimination while the non-minority people excluded
because of preferences are unlikely to have perpetrated, or to have been in any
demonstrable sense benefited from, the discrimination.”186 Thus, the Scalian and Posner
views of white innocence consist of the absence of participation in or perpetuation of
racial discrimination, and the absence of deriving any personal benefit from the existence
of that discrimination.
Upon close examination, Justice Scalia’s definition of innocence as the absence of
participation and benefit from racism, appears to be incoherent because of a serious
internally inconsistency. Although he asserts that he is describing white innocence in the
absolute sense, as he writes, they “took no part in, derived no profit from, the major
historic suppression of the currently acknowledged minority groups, but were in fact
themselves the object of discrimination by the dominant Anglo-Saxon majority.”187
However, he also asserts that although these late European immigrants had no part in
creating the “major historic suppression[s]” of people of color, they later did in fact
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participate in that suppression, as he notes that they “have themselves practiced
discrimination.”188
In addition, although Scalia argues that those immigrants, like his father, “derived
no profit” or benefit from the historic suppression of people of color, he also admits that
“some or all of these groups have been the beneficiaries of discrimination against
blacks.” Perhaps mindful of his own internal logical inconsistency, Scalia does not
conclude from this analysis that immigrants like his father were innocent in any absolute
sense, but rather, merely relatively innocent in comparison to those who personally as he
says, “plied the slave trade, and maintained a formal caste system for many years.”189
It is thus clear that notwithstanding its absolutist billing, Scalia’s logic does not
lead to the conclusion that he claims for it. This is evident by his conclusion that “to
compare th[e] racial debt” of those immigrants groups who “have been the beneficiaries
of discrimination against blacks, or have themselves practiced discrimination…with that
of those who plied the slave trade, and who maintained a formal caste system for many
years thereafter, is to confuse a mountain with a molehill.”190 Thus, in Scalia’s terms
late European immigrants like his father were not completely free of racial guilt. Instead
their own acts of racial discrimination and personal benefit from the racial caste system,
renders their degree of culpability a relative “molehill,” in comparison to the “mountain”
of culpability of historical others who were far worse and benefited far more.
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Thus, despite its billing, even Scalia does not assert that late arriving European
whites are “innocent” per se, but merely comparatively so, in contrast to those who were
actually personally involved in the slave trade, and Jim Crow segregation. It seems an
odd turn of logic to base a sense of contemporary innocence on the existence of
significantly greater historic culpability. Under this odd Scalian logic, it could be argued
that so long as there are greater evil doers in the historic past, even admitted
contemporary evil doers are somehow immunized, and rendered innocent, so long as their
evilness does not surpass an imaginary quantum of past evil.
Thus, Scalian white innocence seems a perverse form of comparative innocence
that no court would accept as exculpating. In essence, to cry that there were once those
worse than me, is hardly a reason to conclude that one’s own culpability should be
diminished as a consequence. This is a sort of “Attila the Hun” defense; which provides
that so long as one can invoke Attila’s past savagery as surpassing one’s own, one can
claim a type of relative innocence. It is charitable to characterize this sort of defense of
white innocence as fundamentally irrational and it appears to only be intelligible and
intellectually coherent through the white-centered-perspective.

i. A Stacked Deck
In their recent study on the “myth of colorblindness” one group of scholars has
likened the experience of being white in contemporary America with the “well known
philosophical maxim, [that] the last thing a fish notices is the water.”191 In this way they
argue that because of this type of immersion phenomenon “things that are unproblematic
seem natural and tend to go unnoticed,” thus “fish take the water they swim in for
191
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granted, just as European Americans take their race as a given, as normal.”192 As a
consequence, most whites “cannot see how this society produces advantages for them
because these benefits seem so natural that they are taken for granted, experienced as
wholly legitimate.”193 Because of this total immersion in social and cultural whiteness,
most whites quite “literally do not see how race permeates America’s institutions—the
very rules of the game—and its distribution of opportunities and wealth.”194 As a result
of failing to appreciate their racially immersed condition in a society awash with
whiteness, most whites take their “racial location for granted” which leads them “to
ignore the way in which race loads the dice in favor of European Americans while
simultaneously restricting African Americans’ access to the gaming table.”195 Thus
ultimately, to most whites “white privilege, like the water that sustains fish, is invisible in
their analysis.”196 However, its invisibility does not lessen the grip of white privilege on
access to social benefits and opportunities, nor ameliorate its dampening effect on nonwhite aspirations and efforts.

ii. Personal Benefit
For these reasons, analyzing the white-centered-perspective analysis on racial
reality can be instructive and illuminating because “understanding a person’s racial
192
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worldview from the perspective of racial identity theory also reveals how a person
participates in and understands individual, institutional, and cultural racism.”197 This is
true because, in America “every white person…is socialized with implicit and explicit
racial messages about him- or herself and members of visible racial/ethnic groups…[and]
[a]ccepting these messages results in racism become an integral component of each white
person’s ego or personality.”198 As a consequence, “evolving a nonracist white identity
begins with individuals accepting their whiteness and recognizing the ways in which they
participate in and benefit from individual, institutional, and cultural racism.”199
From a non-white-centered-perspective, the argument that contemporary whites
derive no benefit from their whiteness, is hopelessly naïve because of the substantial
“cash value”200 that is associated with whiteness. As George Lipsitz has pointed out
“white Americans are encouraged to invest in whiteness, to remain true to an identity that
provides them with resources, power, and opportunity.”201 Moreover, “as long as we
define social as the sum total of conscious and deliberative individual activities, we will

197
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be able to discern as racist only individual manifestations of personal prejudice and
hostility.”202

II.

White Innocence and Affirmative Action
Affirmative action is particularly fertile ground from which to gain insight into

the nature and significance of differences in racial perspectives. This is true because
affirmative action has been, and promises to continue to be an especially polarizing,
contentious, and socially combustible topic with both opposing camps composed largely,
although not exclusively, along racial lines.203 At the core of the disagreement between
these opposing factions is a fundamental miscommunication.204 This miscommunication
is a result of the differences in the racially distinct starting points that ground and orient
each of their respective racial perspectives. Thus, their argument is not so much over the
substantive fairness or effectiveness of affirmative action programs per se, as it is over
the appropriate perspective from which to view it.
For example, this article argues that those who oppose affirmatives action see the
issue from a white-centered perspective that, among other things, presumes that the
social, political, economic, and educational status quo is racially neutral, and that the
202
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social and political debt for slavery was exhausted with the formal dismantling of Jim
Crow and officially enforced racial segregation and subordination, and the enactment of
antidiscrimination legislation. Moreover, this view is also premised on the assumption
that contemporary whites bear no personal responsibility for existing racial inequality
because they had no personal role in the creation of past racism and do not participate in
perpetuating or benefiting from its legacy in the form of present-day racial subordination
and discrimination.
However, this article also argues that those who support affirmative action as a broad
policy matter and see the issue from a non-white-centered perspective have reached very
different conclusions. A non-white-centered perspective on this issue, presumes that the
social, political, economic, and educational status quo is not neutral but is in fact heavily
racially skewed in favor of whites and against non-whites. This view is premised on the
presumption that America’s social and political debt for its historic racial sins of slavery,
Jim Crow and the legacy of legalized discrimination has not been exhausted by the
removal of express and formal barriers of racial discrimination. Instead, this perspective
posits that informal, systemic, institutional, psychological, and unconscious racism
continues to shape and benefit the lives of every white person and to burden the lives of
every non-white person, solely on the basis of race.205
Moreover, this view also holds that contemporary whites do in fact bear a
considerable personal responsibility for the continuing legacy of racial inequality,
because although clearly they are not responsible for the creation of the historical causes
of racism, nonetheless they feed, nourish, aid, abet, and benefit from the legacy of racism
every day in a myriad of ways. As a consequence, they are deeply implicated and
205
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invested in maintaining the racial status quo of deep and continuing racial inequality.
From this perspective it appears that, whether consciously or unconsciously, most whites
engage in personal acts every day that actively reinforce, perpetuate and reinscribe racial
distinctions and promote racial discrimination in society. Thus, from the non-whitecentered perspective, the idea that most contemporary whites are innocent of active
personal participation in promoting, reinscribing, and benefiting from racism is naive.
Affirmative action in education and employment has been combustible social
tender and the source of continuing, deep, and significant white resentment since it was
first introduced.206 In fact it has been suggested that the depth of white resentment is so
profound that, “a number of whites dislike the idea of affirmative action so much and
perceive it to be so unfair that they have come to dislike blacks as a consequence.”207
Thus it is important to keep in mind, as Glen Loury has pointed out that, “the ideological
meanings of a contested racial policy like affirmative action are determined within a
social-cognitive matix that is raced. A similar policy with a different set of beneficiaries
might not have the same ideological resonance.”208 These ideological meanings are
distinctly racial and are reinforced and reinscribed by the language and images that are
employed by the Court in articulating the basis of their decisions in racially inflected
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claims of constitutional violations. Behind these ideological meanings are the Court’s
“unstated assumptions about the nature of difference,”209 which reveal not a racially
neutral jurisprudence but one which is decidedly and constitutionally impermissibly
overly concerned with the welfare of one particular racial group – whites.210
As George Lipsitz has observed, in resenting and resisting affirmative action, whites act
like believe that they are “innocent victims of remedies for a disease that did not exist.”211
Notably, the ideology of white innocence lies at the very heart of this white resentment. Thus,
disrupting this ideology may well constitute the illusive Holy Grail that can redeem such
ubiquitous white resentment. The late scholar, Ron Fiscus presciently made this point in the early
1990’s when he observed that:
“the innocent persons argument is more than an important constitutional argument. It is a
widely held, racially polarizing social argument. The near-universal belief in it is without
doubt the single most powerful source of popular resentment of affirmative action. If the
belief could somehow be undercut, the resentment toward affirmative action and the
associated racial polarization might be diminished.212
209
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Professor Fiscus concludes that if the premise of white innocence “could be rebutted, or
at least narrowed…some critics of affirmative action might well be persuaded of its
constitutionality …others [would] be deprived of a seemingly powerful argument against
it…[and] supporters …would gain new confidence that their judgment is correct.” Thus,
because of its power to engender such profound white resentment, in the hands of the Supreme
Court, the rhetoric of white innocence is not simply used to resolve affirmative action claims;
instead it amounts to a power that is wielded as a weapon of white supremacy in order to justify,
legitimize, and maintain the existing racial status quo. Under such circumstances it is hardly
surprising that America’s debate over affirmative action consists largely of such strident
opposing camps.213

A. Whiteness as Coterminous with Innocence
Although the Court frequently invokes the rhetoric of innocence and equates it
presumptively with whiteness, it neither provides nor even attempts to provide, a
definition for the term.214 This is especially problematic, because without some degree of
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definitional precision, the Court’s invocation of white innocence has no substantive
content that can be reasonably applied, rejected, or even rationally evaluated by the lower
courts.215 However, although it is not always clear precisely what the Court means when
it invokes the rhetoric of innocence, it is clear who they are referring to– they are
referring to whites.

Thus, through the deployment of the rhetoric of white innocence,

the Court appears to have constructed a mythologized and racialized concept of
constitutionally cognizable innocence that does not just include whites, but is in fact
coterminous with whiteness.216
The equivalence of whiteness with innocence is revealingly illustrated in Justice
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter.217 In discussing the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, she explained that the essence of the ‘narrowly tailored’ requirement is its
capacity to ensure that race conscious remedies are constitutionally sustainable only to
the extent that they “work the least harm possible to... innocent persons competing for the
same benefit.”218 She goes on to argue that, “[t]o be narrowly tailored, a race conscious
admissions program must not unduly burden individuals who are not members of the
favored racial … groups.”219
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In this way, Justice O’Connor argues that the proper constitutional measure of
narrow tailoring consists of the extent to which race conscious remedies avoid harming a
group she describes as “innocent persons.” This group of innocent persons consists of
those who are not included in the so-called “favored racial group.” Thus Justice
O’Connor characterize the beneficiaries of race conscious programs as members of a
“favored racial group” and conversely by implication, those who do not necessarily
benefit as members of a non-favored racial group. Since the members of the “favored
racial groups” in race conscious programs are by definition non-white persons,
O’Connor’s logic clearly suggests that the category of “innocent persons,” she has in
mind who must be protected from harm by strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring test, consists
exclusively of an undifferentiated group of bedfellows who are all white.
Moreover, it also suggests that the primary unifying characteristics of the
members of this group are their whiteness, innocence, and victimization from race
conscious affirmative action programs. Any doubt in this regard is resolved by her
conclusion in Grutter in which she noted that the Law School affirmative action program
had passed constitutional muster because, “in the context of its individualized
inquiry…the admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority applicants.”220
Since O’Connor does not define the term innocence, she does not attempt to
establish the innocence of this all white group she imagines. Thus from the Court’s
perspective, the racial innocence of whites is not a result of logical argument with which
one could take issue, instead it appears to be judicially noticed and thereby beyond
debate. It is indeed problematic that the Court simply presumes the existence of racial
innocence, racially equates it with whiteness and neither engages in nor insists that it be
220
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subject to elements of proof or critical inquiry of any sort. It is especially problematic
because to the extent that innocence becomes constitutionally coterminous with
whiteness, how is non-whiteness to be regarded – as not innocent or guilty? What are the
implications of an implicit constitutional presumption of a binary juxtaposition of white
innocence against non-white guilt? Moreover, it is also both curious and highly
problematic that this grouping of innocent whites is obviously quite over- inclusive. By
definition it must commingle such interesting bedfellows as committed white anti-racists
on one extreme, to rabid and committed white supremacists on the other.221
Under this theory, the general category of whites would include people from both
extremes of the innocence spectrum and all the gradations in between. As such, to the
extent that the concept of innocence is thought to be coterminous with whiteness, it is
clearly over-inclusive because it would include many who are clearly not innocent, such
as the Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux as well as many who are such as committed white
anti-racists. Therefore, the Court’s deployment of the notion of innocence is to be
inherently too imprecise and over inclusive a concept to be worthy of serious
constitutional consideration.

B. Affirmative Action and the Ideology of White Innocence
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Although by logical inference O’Connor assumed that the plaintiff Barbara Grutter was an “innocent
white,” suppose instead that it was known that the plaintiff was an avowed white supremacist who hated
anyone who was not white, actively practiced racial discrimination and advocated violent racial holy war?
Under O’Connor’s view of white innocence even this person would be considered racially innocent.
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white lives that would strongly contest that description.
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Each of the four primary elements of the ideology of white innocence identified
earlier have been deployed by the Court, to one extent or another, in resolving racially
inflected claims of constitutional protection. However, the Court’s primary reference
when it invokes the rhetoric of white innocence appears to focus on the third and fourth
elements of the ideology involving racism and racial benefit. Frequently the Court’s
invocation of white innocence is revealed as being deeply embedded in a metric which
the Court refers to as strict scrutiny,222 which requires that in order to pass constitutional
muster, explicitly race conscious government programs must satisfy a bifurcated test
which requires first, that they serve a compelling state interest,223 and second be narrowly
tailored224 to achieve that interest.

1. Innocent of Race
Recall that the earlier discussion of this element of the ideology of white
innocence points out the inherent contradiction in this element. One the one hand, the
white-centered-perspective holds that whiteness is not a race, but rather being simply the
ordinary and regular unraced norm. However, simultaneously, they are also acutely
aware of their own racialized whiteness, and the non-whiteness of racial others, and
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consider those differences to be somehow reflective of real and essential biological
differences.
This element of the ideology of whiteness is on display in the Court’s affirmative
action jurisprudence and reflected in the Court’s discussion of racially neutrality. In
Grutter, O’Connor’s majority opinion noted, again in the context of discussing the narrow
tailoring aspect of the strict scrutiny test, that although “narrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative…[it] does however, require
serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve
the diversity that the university seeks.”225
Taking race into account, or its opposite, not doing so or race neutrality, are
generally and demeaningly understood to mean considering the non-whiteness of nonwhites. However, taking race into account should also require considering the whiteness
of whites; and there have been precious few calls for the elimination of taking this racial
marker into account by affirmative action’s detractors. In effect, one could argue that
their position amounts to one in which they want to ignore non-whiteness, especially
blackness, but they want to continue to take into account whiteness.
In effect, Justice O’Connor’s view of asking admissions officers to seriously and
in good-faith consider race neutral alternatives, is tantamount to asking them to do what
no one in America is capable of doing – that is of imagining an entirely “raceless
person.” What would such a person look like; how would they function in a society that
is so keenly aware and dependant on perceived racial identity; how would their
racelessness affect their treatment, experiences, and opportunities. It is an absurd and
unknowable fantasy in twenty-first century America because there are no unraced people,
225
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no model or paradigm to draw on from which to even imagine one. In America, one is
either white or non-white; race is always there. Thus, if racial neutrality amounts to
ignoring non-whiteness, the only coherent category left is whiteness. As a consequence
any attempted regime of race neutrality would in effect create a situation where everyone
would be presumed to be white…not unraced.
Thus, the Court’s idea of race neutrality is a fantasy of the white-centeredperspective that projects assumptive whiteness on to every applicant. There is nothing
racially neutral about such a program, with or without the express use of racial terms. As
a result, those who are in fact white get their files reviewed from a perspective that
matches their own, which amounts to a racial benefit, not a neutral fact. However, those
who are non-white are assumed to be white, and do not get their files read by a
sympathetic and compatible perspective. In fact, since their files would usually be
reviewed from a white-centered-perspective, their own racial perspective is neither
recognized nor valued, and their lives and accomplishments are reviewed from a
perspective that they do not share.
More importantly, admission decisions that purport to not take race into account,
and thereby claim to be racially neutral are fundamentally hypocritical and irrational.
They are hypocritical because they assume that race can be erased as a relevant factor in
the development of a person’s life up to the point of application. Moreover, these
programs also assume that an individual’s personal racial history of struggle and success
is irrelevant to a rational evaluation of their future prospects of success and public
contribution.
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This view reflects a distinctly white-centered-perspective on race. Because most
whites have the luxury of not having to think of themselves in racial terms, they can
easily project that the same must be true of everyone else. But for most non-whites, and
especially blacks, racial identity is not something they can afford to ignore, because
ordinary social intercourse in America is filled with constant reminders to non-whites that
they are not white.
The Court’s ideal of racial neutrality is also irrational because, in the context of
university admissions a candidate’s past strengths and future potential cannot be
rationally evaluated without all of the candidate’s most relevant pieces of information.
For many non-white applicants, their racial identity is a relevant piece of information,
because for them such an identity forms an important part in determining who they are,
how they got this way, where they want to go, why they want to go there, and the
strength of their motivation to accomplish those goals. To arbitrarily ban this type of
highly relevant and probative information from active consideration by admission
officials is to be willfully blind to the overall detriment of the applicant’s admission
prospects and the institution’s commitment to evaluate the whole candidate.
This position does not depend on a universal relevance of racial experience for all
non-whites, but rather for the universal allowance for its possibility, recognition, and
respect. To the extent that race forms an important part of the empirical social reality in
the lives of many non-white applicants, racial neutrality constitutes an arbitrary,
irrational, and counterproductive policy that strongly advantages whites and heavily
burdens non-whites. In short, such a racially neutral policy is effectively not racially
neutral at all. Thus racial neutrality is only coherent and reasonable when considered
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from a starting point of a white-centered-perspective. From a non-white-centeredperspective, it is a policy that appears to be unrealistic, unfair, highly raced, and deeply
naive.

2. Innocent of Racial Perspective
The narrative of white innocence constitutes what Toni Morrison calls the
“timeless and timely narratives upon which expressive language rests, narratives so
ingrained and pervasive they seem inextricable from reality.”226 Through this rhetorical
narrative the Supreme Court has deeply insinuated into American constitutional discourse
a powerful and irresistible association between whites as a group, and innocence; as the
real victims of affirmative action programs. This powerful and pernicious rhetorical
narrative characterizes whites as innocent and helpless victims who metaphorically, have
been forcibly strapped to the front of the cannon barrel of affirmative action and have
been unjustly punished for the benefit of the unharmed and the undeserving.
The Court’s use of the rhetorical narrative of white innocence has been
remarkably successful in framing and fueling the general affirmative action debate. This
is partially because innocence constitutes an essential characteristic of white racial
identity and of the popular presumption of the racial innocence and neutrality of the law
generally. However, the Court’s choice to champion the cause of white innocence has
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“fueled rather than dowsed”227 the racial flames of discord, division, and distrust in
American legal discourse and in the popular imagination. Paradoxically, the Court’s
approving use of the lanuage of white racial innocence, has implicitly put the
government’s rhetorical imprimatur on this racialized characterization of innocent white
victimization. So much so in fact, that this rhetoric and its various permutations now
constitute one of the few areas of common ground and uncritical acceptance among many
who fill the ranks of both supporters and detractors of affirmative action programs.228
Consequently, both sides in the hotly contested affirmative action debate both wittingly
and unwittingly accept, reproduce, and reinforce a rhetorical narrative of contemporary
American racial reality that constructs and perpetuates a normative and discursive association
between innocence and whiteness. This congruence of opinion affirming a racialized association
between whiteness and innocence fundamentally undermines any moral case in support of
affirmative action programs and strengthens the moral basis of its detractors by allowing them to
“don the armor of moral innocence in their war against affirmative action.”229
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By deploying the rhetorical narrative of white innocence, the Court has been able
to effectively, “alchemize” these “cases about discrimination against disadvantaged
groups, into narratives in which African Americans [and other non-whites]…seek to
deprive white[s] …of their rightful interests.”230 Thus, by cloaking the non- favored
group in affirmative action policies (whites) in the rhetorical narrative of innocence, the
Court has made innocence synonymous with whiteness. As a result, “invoking innocence
has provided the Court with rhetorical cover for its policy choice[s]”231 of either
approving or disapproving the limited use of race as a legitimate selection criterion, while
simultaneously advancing the “racial project”232 of preserving and protecting a status quo
of white dominance and white privilege.
When the Court adopts the white perspective as the presumptive lens through
which to see and describe American racial reality, it ratifies and emboldens the segment
of the public that shares that perspective. Instead of engaging the nation in a dialogue in
which it acknowledges that there is more than one appropriate perspective from which to
see affirmative action, the Court implicitly endorses the view that there is only one
correct factual description and that is the white perspective. Moreover, by failing to even
acknowledge that there is a contest among perspectives, the Court suggests that their
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view is not white at all but in fact a racially neutral, objective description of racial reality,
rather than the racially biased perspective that it really is.

3. Innocent of Racism
As indicated earlier, one of the defining features of the innocence of racism
element of the ideology of white innocence was the notion that racism is largely a thing
of the past in contemporary America, with the exception of rogue individual racists who
act out of a taste for discrimination. However, from a non-white-centered-perspective,
the problem of racism is neither solved nor reserved to individual guilty perpetrators.
Instead, this perspective focuses on systemic racial discrimination that is “the result of the
ways that racial inequalities were embedded in urban space and urban institutions.”233
The primary meaning associated with the Court’s use of the rhetoric of white
innocence appears to be focused on an absence of any white moral blameworthiness for
racism. Under this view, when the Court refers to innocence and equates it with
whiteness, it could be understood to mean that contemporary whites are not responsible
or blameworthy for the history and legacy of racism in American where “race still
matters” so very much in terms of access to the good things in life.234 For example, in
Bakke Justice Powell noted that “there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent
persons in respondent’s position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their
making.”235
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Similarly, the Court in Bakke also described innocent persons as those who “bear
no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program
are thought to have suffered.”236 In his dissent in Adarand, Justice Souter expressed a
similar sense of white innocence when he said, “the result may be that some members of
the historically favored race are hurt by that remedial mechanism, however innocent they
may be of any personal responsibility for any discriminatory conduct.”237 In this sense,
innocence is regarded as suggesting the absence of personal responsibility or moral
blameworthiness for creating the racial problems that race conscious programs like
affirmative action are designed to remedy.
The ideology of white innocence acts as an inherent dampening factor on the
compelling state interest prong of the strict scrutiny standard because this test is
ultimately based on a perception of the significance of race as a social problem and
involves a sense of proportionality. This judgment will necessarily be significantly
influenced by the extent to which racism is considered a thing of the past and only
contemporaneously manifest by the rogue individual in isolated and non-systemic ways,
or a contemporary and deeply insidious systemic and institutional problem. By masking
the contemporaneous, systemic, institutional and daily reality of racism in America, the
courts can artificially limit the occasions when affirmative action is deemed to be
necessary and appropriate.
The Court’s focus on the innocent whites who could be negatively impacted by
race conscious programs elides the issue of the systemic, institutional nature of racial
bias. The search for racial bogey men in the institutions decisional hierarchy, or its
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recent historical record, or in an adjudicated finding of actual discrimination, allows the
Court to avoid the core problem of institutionally racially discriminatory practices that
are so deeply embedded into the levers of social oppression that the machine of racial
oppression no longer requires either a caretaker or a rogue operative to keep it
functioning.
If the Court wants to analyze affirmative action programs against an assumptive
social background of racial reality that views racial discrimination as primarily
individualistic, consciously intentional, and rare, then it has the burden of establishing
these factual premises as being real and accurate and not merely a reflection of their
personal racial bias. Instead, the Court simply asserts this view of America’s racial
reality without any attempt to document, analyze, or even acknowledge its contested
nature. It is thus asserted as an unraced and objective report of reality, when in fact it is
little more than a reflection of a distinctly white-centered-view of hotly contested racial
terrain.
From a non-white-centered-perspective, the more appropriate and accurate view
of racial reality holds that racial discrimination in contemporary America is less the
product of individual rogue racists and more an institutional, systemic, unconscious, and
ubiquitous feature of everyday life. However, rather than even recognizing that there is a
competing paradigm of racial experience in this respect, the Court imposes its own view
without comment, suggesting that they are doing nothing more than projecting their own
personal racial biases as representative of racial reality.
For example in Croson Justice Stevens concluded that the city’s set aside program
“stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the unproven charge of past racial
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discrimination.”238 In making this argument Justice Stevens clearly assumed not only
that the racial status quo in the city of Richmond was neutral but that the white business
men engaged in the construction industry were innocent of racial discrimination. He
argues that while the class of white contractors “unquestionably includes some white
contractors who are guilty of past discrimination against blacks, …it is only habit, rather
than evidence or analysis, that makes it seem acceptable to assume that every white
contractor covered by the ordinance shares in that guilt.”239 He concludes that this
category is clearly overbroad because “it must be assumed that at least some [of the white
contractors] have never discriminated against anyone on the basis of race.”240
How did Justice Stevens reach the conclusion that “it must be assumed” that at
least some of the white contractors in Richmond had never engaged in racial
discrimination against anyone? He specifically refers to the absence of either “fact or
reason,” supporting a blanket indictment of the class, yet he provides neither fact nor
reason in support of his own conclusion of the obviousness of racial innocence among at
least some members of this group. Instead his conclusion smacks of a projection of
personal racial bias and is comprehensible only from a white-centered-perspective.
However, from a non-white-centered-perspective the history of racism,
repression, resistance, and avoidance in Richmond supplies ample factual evidence from
which to conclude that all of the white contractors in the city are presumed to have
engaged in racial discrimination absent specific evidence to the contrary.241 From this
238
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perspective, whites do not receive a presumption of being non-racist. In contrast, Justice
Stevens’ argument clearly presumes the opposite, that whites are presumed to be nonracist generally absent evidence to the contrary, a view that indicates that despite the
substantial evidence of the city’s deeply racist past, all whites should be presumed to be
non-racist. This view can only coherent and sustainable from a white-centeredperspective.
It is important to note that the City Counsel in Croson was not dominated by blacks bent
on revenge against the long years of racist city government. Instead it was a racially mixed
group that had the full support of the white as well as black members; and the support of the
white mayor. When the Court enters into this arena of political compromise of competing racial
perspectives, it is wholly inappropriate for it to arbitrarily pick the white perspective as the
controlling matrix by which the constitutionality of the program in question is to be judged. The
Court clearly did precisely this, as evidenced by many of its stated conclusions offered in defense
of its decision. For example the Court argued that the absence of blacks from meaningful
participation in the construction industry might be the result, not of long history of racialized
exclusion by the local players, but rather perhaps because there is something about black people
that inclines them not to choose to participate in the construction industry. As Justice O’Connor
observed:
“There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority participation, including past
societal discrimination in education and economic opportunities as well as both black and white
career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to industries other

minorities, not imposed on them, should raise an inference that minorities in Richmond had much to
remedy.”)
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than construction. The mere fact that black membership in these trade associations is low,
standing alone, cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination.”242
Just precisely what “other industries” did Justice O’Connor have in mind that blacks may
be “disproportionately attracted to”? This is a very disturbing and ominous reference and
whatever she had in mind, the very idea that any racial group would necessarily be inclined
either toward or away from any particular industry, simply on the basis of their racial
identification, strongly invokes rejected notions of racial essentialism and stereotyping that are
supposed to be a relics of America’s racist past, and by any reasonable standard, inappropriate
measures of constitutional principles.
However, notions of occupational racial essentialism that naturally inclines black people
either toward or away from particular industries and occupations is a white stereotype and
fantasy of long standing in America. It is therefore clearly a product of a white perspective on a
racialized “other” which is not shared by blacks themselves or by a non-white-centered
perspective. Nevertheless, it was a perspective that was casually adopted by the Court without
comment, justification, evidentiary support, or any defense whatsoever. It was in effect, a fact of
which the Court inappropriately presumed to take judicial notice. However, in reality, it was
nothing more than the naked adoption by the Court of the white perspective as the controlling
matrix of reality, in a manner that is patently arbitrary, and completely at odds with the racial
compromise worked out fairly in the local political process.
The essence of the Court’s error in choosing a particular racial perspective to control its
view of the case is not necessarily that it has made the wrong choice. The important point is that
is has made a choice at all. The metaphysical truth of the competing racial perspectives is not
within the Court’s province. The practical realities of efficiently and constitutionally managing
242
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the affairs of state are the only things with which the Court may be legitimately concerned. Thus
where the competing racial perspectives have reached a fair and acceptable compromise in the
political process the Court has no constitutional basis to interfere.243
Part of the Court’s problem in this regard stems from what many regard as its
misunderstanding of the moral imperative of the Equal Protection Clause. Both Justices
Kennedy and Scalia explicitly endorsed a view that considers that “the moral imperative” of that
Amendment is nothing more than “racial neutrality.”244 That is a technical and superficial
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment that can withstand neither historical nor rational scrutiny.
Although it does not exhaust the Amendment, one of its principal targets was the elimination of
racial caste in America. As Cass Sunstein has persuasively argued in describing the “anticaste
principle,”245 “an important purpose of the Civil War Amendments was the attack on racial
caste.”246 The moral imperative of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as all of the Civil War
Amendments was not to achieve racial neutrality as an end in itself, but rather only to use it as
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one tool among many to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating the sense of racial caste that
had justified and sustained racial slavery for over 200 years.
The Court’s willingness to project its own racial views is apparent in other
contexts as well. For example, in Richmond v. J.A. Croson, the Court argues that the
affirmative action plan endorsed by the city will likely have a negative impact on black
business people who would benefit from it. This is because, as Justice Stevens argues in
his concurrence, “although it stigmatizes the disadvantaged class with the unproven
charge of past discrimination, it actually imposes a greater stigma on its intended
supposed beneficiaries.”247
The disadvantage that Justice Stevens had in mind is caused by the fact that, as he
observed “a statute of this kind inevitably is perceived by many as resting on an
assumption that those who are granted this special preference are less qualified in some
respect that is identified purely by their race.”248 Two questions quickly come to mind.
First, how does he know this; what is Justice Steven’s authority for this proposition?
Second, who are the “many” that will perceive affirmative action programs in this way;
moreover why does their view count for so much with the Court?
First, Justice Stevens’s primary legal authority for this proposition is his own
opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, which he quotes at length.249 Second, clearly the
“many” that Justice Stevens had in mind consists of those he refers to as the “disfavored
group,” by which he means whites. Thus, Justice Stevens is explicitly arguing that
because the white perspective will view this program negatively, and will regard its
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beneficiaries as “less qualified,” that somehow this is a constitutionally cognizable
consideration of sufficient importance to weigh heavily in favor of overturning the
program. As if to emphasize what he apparently believes is a strongly made point, he
follows the extensive quoted passage from Fullilove by concluding with “accordingly, I
concur…”250
Having judicially noticed the white-centered-perspective, without any evidentiary
support whatsoever, the Court does not then measure it against the non-white perspective
and engage in a rational evaluation of the competitors. In fact no other perspectives are
even acknowledged, leaving the clear impression that the white perspective not only
exhausts the rational field but also reflects the personal views of the individual justices on
the Court.
Do non-whites generally agree with this view? Do blacks generally agree? Do the
past black beneficiaries agree? The Court does not know, does not ask, and is apparently
not interested in knowing. Instead, its rhetorical language clearly suggests that in the
Court’s mind, there is only one rational perspective on this issue and it is articulated in
the white perspective of the “many.” Thus, the perspective, experience, and opinion of
the beneficiaries is not relevant. The white-centered-perspective can determine the
existence of stigma even better than those who supposedly suffer from its burden. Again,
this illustrates the Court’s arbitrary racial preference of the white perspective.
Moreover, even if Justice Stevens’s prediction of the white reaction is correct,
why is it constitutionally relevant? Unfortunately he does not tell us. Moreover, his
argument suggests that the degree of resentment and disrespect by the “many” who share
the white perspective on this matter, will somehow be different than their current view of
250
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the beneficiary group if the program was overturned. However, from a non-whitecentered-perspective it can be reasonably argued that the reality is that the degree of
racism, of racial disrespect, and resentment of whites toward non-whites, especially
blacks, and especially in the South, did not begin with affirmative action and would not
end if affirmative action disappeared tomorrow. From this perspective such disrespect
and low regard for blacks by whites already exists, not only in the South but all over
America, and to such a high degree that whatever incremental addition might be caused
by Richmond’s program is but a drop in a preverbal bucket of racism. In short, it would
make little or no difference at all in the ambient degree of white resentment.
Thus the Court fails to adequately justify its choice of the white perspective on the
issue of resentment and disrespect. Moreover, it also does not explain why the amount of
such feelings, even if in fact engendered by this program, would make a difference in the
racial status quo. Which leaves the question open, how much white racial resentment is
necessary in order to be constitutionally cognizable? Justice Steven’s argument in
Fullilove, repeated in Croson, and cited in Grutter by Justice O’Connor, suggests that the
mere fact that white resentment exists at all, in whatever degree, is automatically
constitutionally cognizable. Therefore, in a stark implication of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it also suggests that non-white resentment has not
received comparable constitutional consideration. In fact it has received far less than a
comparable amount because it has received none at all. Thus, from a constitutional
perspective, it appears that racial resentment is only relevant if it is white.
Finally, there is one additional problem with Justice Stevens’s argument that
again emphasizes its profound racial influenced quality. His conclusion regarding
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negative assumptions about the qualifications of the beneficiaries of racial preference
programs does not seem to apply outside of the racial arena. For example, there is no
evidence of similar assumptions regarding the beneficiaries of veteran’s preference
programs or of legacy preference programs.

Thus, either Stevens is wrong about the

reaction to preference programs or the resentment or disrespect he anticipates is not due
to a rational inference that the beneficiaries of preference must be deficient if they need
such a program, but rather to the racial identity of the beneficiaries. However, a nonwhite-centered perspective would argue that any white resentment that may be identified
as emanating from such programs actually pre-dated their creation and used the
programs’ existence to justify negative feelings that already existed.

III. White Innocence and the Fourth Amendment
The substantive content of the “reasonable person” standard starkly reveals the
ubiquity and insidiousness of the narrative of white innocence as seen through the lens of
the white-centered-perspective. Although the Court has never expressly said so, a careful
analysis of its reasoning in a wide range of cases suggests, at least in the context of
constitutional criminal law, that the proverbial legal touchstone of the “reasonable
person” in fact reflects the perspective of the innocent white person. Thus, the
“reasonable person” standard is not some abstract, ideological metric that is colorless,
unraced, or inherently raceless.
Instead, it is a distinctly socially raced perspective which reflects only one racial
view and masquerades as objective reality. Thus as articulated by the Court, the
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reasonable person standard neither reflects nor respects any account of reality that is not
mediated through the white-centered-perspective. Moreover, the Court’s choice of the
white-centered-perspective as the baseline for the reasonable person standard reflects a
fundamentally arbitrary and unprincipled racial preference for whiteness in violation of
constitutional guarantees of both Due Process Clause and Equal Protection251.

1. Seizure of the Person
The discipline of constitutional criminal law, particularly the Fourth
Amendment,252 provides a revealing and illuminating window on the interplay between
the ideology and rhetoric of white innocence and the racial paradox of competing
racialized perspectives on reality. An excellent illustration of how the Court has made
this arbitrary racial preference for the white over the non-white perspective can be found
in a line of cases that address the legal standard under which a government seizure of
one’s person has occurred that is sufficient to trigger Fourth Amendment constitutional
scrutiny.
In Florida v. Bostick,253 the defendant claimed that he had been illegally seized
when “two armed Broward County Sheriff officers wearing bright green “raid”
jackets,”254 boarded his interstate bus at a rest stop in Florida while they were engaged in
a random drug interdiction sweep of interstate buses. When they boarded the bus, “the
officers admittedly without articulable suspicion picked out the defendant”255 who was
seated at the rear seat of the bus, and interrogated him. During this interrogation Bostick
251
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remained seated on the rear seat of the bus, while the two officers stood over him in the
isle. While both officers were armed, one of the officers was “holding a recognizable
zipper pouch, containing a pistol.”256 Although disputed by Bostick at trial, the trial court
found as a fact that at the request of the officers Bostick consented to a search of his
luggage. In his bags the officers found contraband and arrested him for trafficking in
narcotics.
Bostick argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment because he had
been illegally seized by the officers at the time it occurred. He urged the Court to find
that under the “free to leave” test articulated in Michigan v. Chesternut, he in fact did not,
and moreover, no reasonable person similarly situated would have felt free to leave. In
support of this position he pointed out that because the police encounter “took place in
the cramped confines of a bus” it was intimidating because the police “tower[ed] over a
seated passenger and there was little room to move.”257 Although the Florida Supreme
Court agreed with Bostick’s characterization of the police encounter, the Supreme Court
did not and overturned and remanded the case.
Writing for the Court Justice O’Connor concluded that under these facts there was
“some doubt whether a seizure occurred.”258 She argued that the Court had long
recognized that a seizure did not occur for Fourth Amendment purposes merely because
“the police ask questions of an individual, ask to examine the individuals identification
and request consent to search his or her luggage – so long as the officers do not convey a
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message that compliance with their request is required.”259 Both Bostick and the Court
agreed that the appropriate legal standard governing the constitutional question of seizure
was to the reasonable person. However, the Court disagreed that the appropriate question
was whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. Instead, Justice O’Connor
argued that the correct rule under these circumstances rested less on the “free to leave”
test, and more “on the principle that those words were meant to capture.”260

i. Reasonable Person Test
Justice O’Connor explained that the traditional free to leave test was inadequate to
the circumstances of the interior of a bus setting and that the more “appropriate inquiry is
whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ request or otherwise
terminate the encounter.”261 The Court was emphatic that the “crucial test is whether,
taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct
would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the
police presence and go about his business.”262 Moreover, the Court noted that a
reasonable person could engage in this behavior and ignore the police requests “without
fearing prosecution.”263
In measuring the “coercive effect of” Bostick’s “encounter”264 with the police, the
Court did not find the physical circumstances in the back of the bus particularly
probative. To the extent that Bostick felt physically confined, the Court concluded that it
259
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was causally unconnected to the police presence. Rather, they held that he was “confined
in a sense, but this was the natural result of his decision to take the bus; it says nothing
about whether or nor the police conduct at issue was coercive.” 265 Moreover, the Court
did not consider the fact that one of the officers was holding a pistol in his hand
particularly coercive either. Interestingly, in reaching this conclusion, the Court
recharacterized the Florida Supreme Court’s factual account, and did not acknowledge, as
Florida court had, that the officer was “holding” a pistol in his had in a “recognizable
zipper pouch.”266 Instead the Court described the scene as one in which the officer was
merely “carried a zipper pouch containing a pistol—the equivalent of carrying a gun in a
holster.”267
The Court never explained how it reached this conclusion of effective equivalence
between the pouch and a holster. Apparently it was a matter which the Court was
prepared to make a matter of judicial notice. Moreover, regardless of whether the pistol
was ‘held’ or ‘carried,’ or whether there was any meaningful distinction between having
a gun in a holster or in hand, the Court observed that it could not reasonably be a source
of intimidation because, as Justice O’Connor argued “the gun was never removed from
its pouch, pointed at Bostick, or otherwise used in a threatening manner.”268
The Court’s decision in Bostick is remarkable for a number of reasons, not the
least of which is the deft manner in which the fact that Bostick was a Black man and the
two police were white was completely erased from the majority’s decision as to what
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constituted the “totality of the circumstances.” In this way, as a result of the Court seeing
the factual scenario of this case through what some have described as “the racial lens of
colorblindness,”269 Bostick’s Blackness was rendered both invisible and irrelevant.
However, despite its colorblind rhetoric, it would not be accurate to suggest that the
Court erased race completely form the case. The is true because as articulated by the
Court, the focus of the reasonable person test is only nominally on the citizen; it is more
pointed focused on the police officer’s perspective, and in so doing renders the officer’s
whiteness both relevant and determinative.

ii.. The Irrelevance of Race to the Reasonable Person Standard
Despite the Court’s acknowledgement that the relevant controlling legal standard
clearly and explicitly requires a consideration of the “totality of the circumstances,” it
implicitly concluded that the race of the parties in a citizen-police encounter was not a
relevant legal consideration in determining whether the target of police questioning
would reasonably feel an inhibiting amount of intimidation and coercion. Thus the Court
can be fairly understood to suggest that the fact that Bostick was Black and the two
officers were white, was irrelevant to a judgment on the voluntariness of his purported
consent to a search of his luggage.
Although the Court did not expressly address the issue of the racial identity of the
parties to a police-citizen encounter, in fact by not recognizing race at all, and by noting
that “the reasonable person standard…does not vary with the state of mind of the
particular individual being approached, the Court implicitly ruled racial considerations
out of bounds for judicial consideration. This decision is quite shocking in light of the
269
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substantial body of evidence and literature collected and disseminated not only by the
academic community but by the police community as well, that clearly recognizes that
the relationship between the police and non-whites generally, but especially Black men,
is fraught with mutual feelings of “fear and loathing.”270
The Court’s rhetoric of colorblindness masks the pivotal fact that in contemporary
America the perceived race of the citizen is a principal animating and frequently
determinative factor that both infects and inflects every encounter between the police and
the public. In short, whites and non-whites, but especially Blacks, are treated differently
by the police, simply because they are perceived as white or non-white, or especially
Black.271
The Court could not possibly have been ignorant of the well known antipathy that
exists between Black men and the police and the fact that “many blacks operate under the
assumption that police/citizen encounters are potentially life threatening.272 Thus their
failure to even address this issue in applying the reasonable person test, makes it clear
that the Court felt that the race of the target of police interrogation is simply not a
relevant consideration in determining how a reasonable person would react under
similarly situated circumstances. However, one could persuasively argue that unless the
reasonable person similarly situated to Bostick were also racially regarded as Black, he
would not be sufficiently similarly situated to be an accurate measure of appropriate
behavior.
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iii.

Multiple Interpretations of Reasonableness

The Court’s reasoning reflects their view that there is only one interpretation of
reasonableness. However, the reasonable person test is amenable to multiple and
antinomic interpretations based on their particular racial experiential perspectives. Thus a
common racial experiential foundation would yield common interpretations. Conversely,
antipodal or completely opposite racial experiential foundations would necessarily lead to
discordant and often even inconsistent interpretations. This combination of nonsynchronous white versus non-white racial interpretations constitutes a critical racial
paradox. This racial paradox requires the law to choose between competing racially
inflected experiential foundations as the arbiter of racial reality. This choice is critical
because in many cases it is likely to be outcome determinative. Thus the Due Process
Clause assures American citizens that the government will not make this choice
arbitrarily, irrationally, or on the basis of bias or prejudice.
At minimum the Constitutional guarantees of the Due Process Clause should
ensure that the choice between controlling racial perspectives is based on a rational
process. However, at this moment in America’s history the Court makes this choice
unconsciously, covertly, inarticulately and without the benefit of any rational evaluative
process. The Court chooses the white perspective as the default standard because it has
been inclined to identify the white perspective with an assumptive mythology of unraced
reality. This myth of an objective unraced reality that is accessible only through the
white perspective is insidious, seductive and deeply oppressive to those who do not share
participate in the national myth.
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Recognizing multiple racially inflected interpretations of reasonableness is not the
same as suggesting that the reasonable person standard should varying “with the state of
mind of the particular individual”273 involved in an encounter with the police. Rather it
represents recognition of only a binary distinction in perspective along a white versus
non-white continuum. Although there may be sub-perspectives within the non-white
category representing ethnic or national boundaries, the resolution of those conflicts is
relatively minor compared to the significance of rejecting the legitimacy of the white
monopoly on legally recognized reality.
The Court tries to solve this racial perspective paradox by defining one of its
contradictory features out of existence. However, the non-white perspective will not
disappear just because the Court refuses to recognize its existence. The distinctly white
perspective on racial reality has achieved its legal currency, interpretive dominance, and
judicial legitimacy through the obfuscation of its own racial contingency and the
rhetorical subordination of competing racialized perspectives and interpretations. This
legitimacy is unearned, undeserved, and inappropriate because it has no rational basis and
was not the product of a rational process. Instead, it is the product of an irrational
assumption of whiteness as an unraced, normative and racially objective lens on racial
reality. Moreover, this white perspective is not the legitimate victor of a contest between
competing racialized interpretations. Instead, it was implicitly declared beyond the reach
of competing views and anointed the winner by the Court.
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iv.

The Black or Non-White Reasonable Person Standard

The Bostick Court refused to take Bostick’s blackness into account in applying
the reasonable person test. In effect, ignoring the fact that Bostick is Black, and failing to
acknowledge the white racialized character of the reasonable person standard is
tantamount to the Court suggesting that a Black or any other non-white person will only
deemed by the law to be acting reasonably when they are acting like whites. Of course,
neither this nor any reasonably politic court would ever explicitly hold that blacks must
act white in order to be regarded as reasonable. Yet the conception of the reasonable
person as articulated by Justice O’Connor amounts to precisely the same thing.274
Thus it could be argued that the aim of the white-centered-perspective is total
domination, where non-whites are expected to eventually abandon their own non-white
identity and perspective and act like, think like and to see both themselves and the rest of
the world through the white-centered-perspective. However, unlike ethnic Europeans
who have long since made this deal and thus assimilated into whiteness, capitulation for
non-whites will not make them into whites. However, from the non-white-perspective, it
will make them more palatable to whites and thereby facilitate continued white
supremacy and dominance.275

IV. Constitutional Concerns with White Innocence
The rhetoric of white innocence creates and perpetuates a mythology of a
generalized racial “innocence of law”276 which considers the legal landscape to be free of
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systemic racial biases absent the insertion of race through affirmative action programs.
In this way the constitutional rhetoric of white innocence reinforces white supremacy by
legitimating the status quo as the product of racially neutral social, political and
individualistic decisions and discursive dynamics. Rather than being constructed by
systemic and institutional racist practices and stereotypes, it posits that racism is only
problematic to the extent that it is the product of the blameworthy actions of individual
bad actors, who are motivated by conscious and intentional racism. In this way, it
reinforces the broad discursive innocence of whites collectively by locating racially
discriminatory behavior outside the normative structure of whiteness, and characterizing
it as aberrant and individualistic.

1. Due Process
The Due Process Clause, "like its forebear in the Magna Carta ... was intended to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government' ...."277
Thus, due process necessarily presumes both rationality and materiality. That is, the
essence of the Due Process Clause is a guarantee of a degree of reasonableness that
matters – that makes a difference on the outcome.
A process that makes no difference on the outcome is an irrelevancy and is no
process at all. Thus, if the white-centered perspective always wins and in so doing
(“Liberal cosmology provides a particular protection of law’s innocence…[but] on the contrary racism is
compatible with and even integral to law.”)id at 119, 121. As if absent explicit governmental uses of racial
categories to benefit non-whites, the competition for government benefits is in fact racially neutral territory
and devoid of existing racially determinative influences; as if absent explicit racial remedies, the
competitive scene is a racially pristine canvass uncontaminated by pre-existing and outcome determinative
elements of highly racialized preference, privilege, and advantage.
277
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BYSTANDER IS INJURED, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 161, 1995
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achieves a kind of unquestioned hegemony, it cannot be said to have been the result of a
reasonable process. Instead, it is evidence of a deeply flawed and broken process that has
in a very real sense made whiteness the measure of realness. The choice for non-whites
under this despotic rule of the white perspective has been to either allow it to supplant
their own racialized experience of the world, or to achieve a type of “bi-visuality”
whereby they can be visually fluent in both racial perspectives.
Non-whites in America have always struggled to achieve a degree of mastery over
this kind of racial bi-visuality of perspective as a survival mechanism. The need for such
fluency began when the first chains of racialized slavery were forged in the English
colonies, and continues to the present day to impress itself with frightening speed,
intensity, and clarity on every non-white, but especially Black face that immigrates to
America.278

Thus for non-whites in America, racial bi-visual fluency is an essential

survival skill. Some non-whites have always absorbed and accepted the non-white
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perspective as their own and even preached it to their fellows279, however, the vast
majority have historically and continue to choose bi-visual fluency over total perspectival
surrender, occupation, and colonization by the white-centered-perspective.280
Through the lens of the white-centered-perspective not only are whites perceived
to be innocent, but the law itself is also similarly regarded. The ideological
underpinnings of this view is a form of judicial self-inflicted colorblindness, whereby the
Court and the general public presume the law itself to be free of racial inflection,
presumption or bias. From the non-white-centered perspective, the law constitutes a
primary engine in the creation and perpetuation of both race itself and the racialization of
society. When the Court adopts one of these perspectives as the controlling lens of a case,
it has an obligation to at minimum explain its choice.
However, instead the Court chooses the white-centered-perspective, not as the
prevailing party in a contest between combatants, but rather as the naturally or divinely
anointed seer of reality, as if there was never any real choice to make. This choice is
supported by neither reason nor logic, and thus, at is core it represents a fundamentally
arbitrary assertion of governmental power that is anathema to a system grounded on due
process guarantees. This is true because any process that results in arbitrary decisions
cannot possibly lay claim to being a “due process.” In addition it constitutes a clear
unconstitutional racial preference by government without even a colorable claim to
advancing a compelling state interest or being narrowly tailored. Thus, seeing racial
reality through the white-centered-erspective inclines the Court to make arbitrary racial
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preferences in favor of whiteness that are antipodal, meaning that they are simultaneously
irrational, glaringly obvious, and totally invisible.

2. Arbitrariness
One of the most fundamental constitutional rights consists of the right to be free
from arbitrary and capricious government decision making. In order to survive
constitutional scrutiny under the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment,
among others, government decisionmaking must have at minimum a rational basis. In
short, a fundamental requirement of ordered liberty in a participatory democracy consists
of the right to be free of government decisionmaking grounded in bias, personal
prejudice, or vindictiveness.

V. Recommendations
A. Acknowledging Competing Racial Perspectives
If the Court were to implement the analytical approach that this article suggests, it
could have significant implications for both the results and the constitutional analysis for
future race cases. For example, if we were to apply this approach to Croson Justice
Scalia could not have simply argued that the Constitution forbids racial categorization per
se and thus cannot accommodate the notion of benign discrimination. He would have
been constrained to acknowledge that although this reflects a legitimate construction of
the Constitution, it is also based on a distinctly white perspective. Public honesty would
have then compelled him to acknowledge that from a non-white-centered perspective,
and especially a black perspective, the racial prohibitions of the Civil War Amendments
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are fundamentally anti-subordination in character and were intended to police racial
categories only to the extent that they contributed to the creation or perpetuation of a
system of subordination and racial caste.281
From this perspective, racial classifications by the state are perfectly legitimate,
so long as they do not create or perpetuate a system of subordinate racial caste. Although
Justice Stevens argues in Croson that the white business not favored under the city’s plan
were stigmatized by the program,282 there can be no serious argument that affirmative
action programs have in any way contributed to incarcerating whites as group to a lower
and subordinated social class. Thus, it would to be conceded that taken from the starting
point of the non-white perspective; benign discrimination plans by government do not run
afoul of the anti-discrimination prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment unless and until
whites as a group are realistically threatened with being reduced to a socially subordinate
lower caste.
Having distinguished the two competing threshold perspectives and the logical
extension of both, one disallowing all racial categories on a per se basis and the other
condemning such classifications strictly under the anti-subordination principle, how then
does the court justify a choice of one over the other. Neither has an exclusive command
of the truth. Each is premised on a distinctly racialized view of reality, and based on that
logical foundation, leads rationally to its conclusion. How then does the Court break the
tie between competing perspectives? Which ever perspective the Justices choose under
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these conditions, their reasoning would expose and reveal a great deal about their
thinking with respect to the racial perspectives appropriate for the law to consider.
A simple majoritarian justification would be seductive, but quite problematic.
This is because at minimum it would inexorably lead to difficulty in those jurisdictions
where whites have already become or are fast becoming a numerical minority.
Moreover, nationally it has been estimated that somewhere between 2025 – 2050
America will cease to have a numerically dominant majority race. Thus, with whites as a
racial group in clear and inexorable decline as a numerical majority, a majoritarian basis
would be very thin and shifting ground upon which to base a tie breaking preference
between the competing racial perspectives. Judicial expressions of personal
identification with either perspective would be obviously inappropriate bases for
distinction as well.
A principled and rationally articulated, non-raced based distinction between the
two perspectives would be indeed difficult if not impossible. The Court would then be
forced to consider a compromise between them thus, unlike the status quo,
acknowledging a high degree of respect for both. The ultimate result would thus be a
product of policy and practicality rather than one fraudulently alleged to derive from a
race neutral application of pure reason. As a compromise solution it would likely satisfy
neither side completely, but both sides would participate to some degree in the final result
and thus neither would be left out; no clear winner, but no clear losers either. This
approach is consistent with the finest traditions of participatory democracy and in fact
precisely reflects the constitutional origins of the American experiment in popular
government.
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Conclusion
The normative deployment of the rhetoric of white innocence in both the Supreme
Court’s affirmative action and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrate that the
Court is unreflectively locked into a white-centered-perspective or master framework in
terms of its ability to perceive and understand America’s racial reality. As a consequence,
this racially limited perspective distorts the Court’s appreciation for the full and balanced
texture of racial reality in contemporary America and thus both limits its analysis and
dooms its remedies to inadequacy and ineffectiveness in combating the nation’s real
intractable racial problems.
The answer to this problem is simultaneously both deceptively simple and
abstractly complex. It begins with a simple act, as captured in Martha Minnow’s
observation in the epigraph of this article, of recognizing that “any point of view,
including one’s own, is a point of view.”283 From this simple act comes an implicit
recognition of the existence and thus validation of opposing points of view. In this way,
those, particularly the Supreme Court, who are locked into a white-centered-perspective,
can come to recognize and appreciate that their views on racial matters reflect only a
particular racial experience formed in a racially oriented culture that neither speaks for
nor completely exhausts the metaphysical truth about America’s racial reality.
Thus, through this recognition they can come to not only to appreciate their own
perspective as both racialized and limited, but also simply as only a perspective, and thus
to respect competing perspectives that may see the world through a different colored
perspectival lens. Without that threshold recognition the differences in racially inflected
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perspectives “admit no common ground,” and result in “black and white Americans
tak[ing] possession of distinct paradigms. In the extreme, blacks and whites look upon
the social and political world in fundamentally different and mutually unintelligible
ways…speaking across different theoretical paradigms.”284 As a consequence, “white
and black citizens appear to have a terrible time talking to one another about race.”285
However, despite the size of the gap that separates the white-centered from the nonwhite-centered view of racial reality, it is not impossible to engage in “democratic
discussion across the racial divide…but it is hard.”286
A significant part of the problem in speaking across different racial paradigms is
that the white-centered-perspective, especially as articulated by the Supreme Court,
refuses to acknowledge that it is a racial paradigm or reflects a particular racial
perspective. Therefore it cannot recognize the existence of any legitimate competition. In
the logic of this perspective, since it represents the objective truth, its only competition
must be falsity, error or untruth. Any dissenting opinions are thus derisively dismissed as
interest based ideologies or identity politics and are engaged only for the purpose of
enlightening them or bringing them up to the point where they can be converted to also
see the world through the white-centered-perspective. This is essentially missionary
work to save the godless and savage soul, not political engagement with respected and
worthy ideological opponents. This is not a sound basis for deliberation. By definition,
such a perspective seeks not mutual respect but rather demands absolute surrender, total
capitulation and thus assimilation.
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Thus finding common ground requires first, attaining “a language of mutual
respect,”287 because as Cornel West said so eloquently, we must come to “respect the
scars and wounds of each other,” and hopefully through that process of mutual respect,
also come to see the critical influence that those scars and wounds have in determining
the perspectival line of sight form which we all experience and understand racial reality.
This simple act of mutual respect and validation can potentially have deeply
transformative and healing effects on America’s discordant racial dialogue, which in the
end could allow us to talk about race more comfortably, productively, and realistically; as
race is actually lived in America rather than merely how it is imagined and perceived
thorough a white-centered lens. This is a goal we must achieve if racial inequality is ever
to be solved. The work is hard but “the stakes are high”288 and thus failure is not an
option.

287

Id at 289
Id (noting that “Race, Du Bois chastened us, is “merely a concrete test of the underlying principles of
the great republic” As it was in the beginning of the twentieth century, so it is now.”) (citing the W.E.B.
DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, (Vintage Press [1903], 1990))

288

94

